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Abstract 
This master’s thesis investigates the key uncertain factors and phenomena influencing the cost 
estimation process in tunnel projects. For this, two completed tunnels from the SVV (Statens 
Vegvesen – Road Authority) are deeply analyzed, seeking for lessons learned, success factors and 
rooms for improvement. Based on the information collected, we aim to provide insights for the 
cost estimate process in a third similar project that is under development (Helltunnel). 
This thesis provides background information about the completed projects, describes the usefulness 
of learning from experiences and illustrates the main uncertain factors in tunneling projects. The 
scope of the research was oriented towards the areas of interest appointed by SVV. These areas 
were developed through the tacit and explicit knowledge gathered in the interviews; and based on 
the analysis of the information collected; we provided insights for the new cost estimation process. 
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Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations are used throughout the chapters of this report. They must be 
understood according to the specific description given in this section. 
 
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis 
CE Cost Estimate 
dm3 Cubic decimeter 
EHS Environmental, Health & Safety 
JBV Jerbaneverket 
km Kilometer 
LL Lessons Learned 
M  Meter 
m3 Cubic meter 
PM Project Management 
PLC Project Life Cycle 
PRM Project risk management 
RFC Reference Class Forecasting 
SVV Statens Vegvesen 
UM Uncertainty management 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter sets up the frames for the master thesis. It introduces the reader into the background 
and scope of the study. Thus, the limitations are also enlisted. Ultimately, the structure of the report 
is indicated to the reader.  
1.1 Background 
In general, the traditional project management displays significance consistency along its theories. 
The majority of them aim to assure conformance in regards to time, budget, quality and scope 
(Crawford, Pollack, & England, 2006; Koskela & Howell, 2002; Perminova, Gustafsson, & 
Wikström, 2008). The latter objectives promote a coordination-oriented way of management; in 
which planning performs as the core task for the management of a project and the people and 
activities involved in the processes operate under the “Steel Curtain” (Koskela & Howell, 2002). 
Likewise, this is the form how traditional PM interprets risk management. PM states that the risk 
management activities like risk identification, analysis, control and monitoring are supported by 
the planning tool (Institute, 2004; Perminova et al., 2008). However, the pass of the time and the 
experiences along projects have opened the space for new theories and trends in PM. These 
newcomers consider a project as an on-going process, which must be consistently measured and 
adjusted according to the real performance (R. Turner & Müller, 2003). They consider that any 
project has unclear constraints and limitations that are hardly mapped in the planning phase 
(Perminova et al., 2008). Therefore, the (new) risk/uncertainty management has developed/adapted 
strategies oriented to identify and mitigate these uncertain events. Among them, one can recognize 
the so-called: lessons learned/reflective learning. This strategy has been appointed by several 
authors, which have stressed the importance of collecting and using the lessons learned from 
project to project (Daudelin, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Jugdev, 2012; Perminova et al., 2008; J. R. 
Turner, Keegan, & Crawford, 2000; Williams, 2008). In brief, the lessons-learned strategy seeks 
to share knowledge about the elements that did / did not go according to plan, the parts that could 
be improved, and the plans/strategies to address these issues (Jugdev, 2012). These practices have 
been empirically proved and the actual benefits are higher than expected (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Jugdev, 
2012; Williams, 2008). Nonetheless, it is also clear that: (1) in general the knowledge and lessons 
learned derived from a project are not systematically incorporated in the development of 
subsequent projects; and, (2) it is not completely clear that the actual techniques used to transfer 
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the information (mainly verbally feedback systems among a limited group) accomplish their goal 
(Kartam, 1996; Williams, 2008). These two reasons motivated the purpose of this research. The 
Norwegian Public Road Administration – Statens Vegvesen is willing to structure a more accurate 
cost estimate process for a new tunnel in the project Ranheim – Værnes. Their interest was focused 
towards the uncertain factors involved in the tunnel construction. Therefore, jointly we (SVV, the 
supervisor and writer) decided to select two similar and completed tunnel projects in order to reflect 
and collect the lessons learned from them. The objective was to dig into them, and grasp all the 
relevant information that could help to enhance the cost estimate process for the new tunnel project. 
In addition to the two projects and its informants, the study was complemented with additional 
information taken from external sources (literature, SVV documents). As follows, a brief 
description of the tunnel projects (two completed, one new) and their characteristics:  
1.1.1 Strindheim Tunnel 
The Strindheim tunnel was built as the new entrance to Trondheim from the east. This tunnel was 
a part of the E6 – Stjørdal project and consisted of two tunnels with profile T9.5, which were 
constructed in accordance to the F tunnel class1 guidelines (See Appendix A). The first tunnel has 
2.14 km of mountain tunnel and 140 m of concrete tunnel and it was built by Skanska. The second 
tunnel consists of 330 m of concrete tunnel and it was built by NCC in Møllenberg (west side). The 
tunnel was drilled in both directions and the masses were mainly deposited in Grillstadmarina 
(Vegvesen, 2015). 
 
Figure 1 - Total overview Strindheim tunnel (Vegvesen, 2014b) 
                                                 
1 Class F: It must have accidents niches every 500 m, cross connections every 250 m, emergency station per lane 
with one emergency phone and two fire extinguishers every 125 m. Remote controlled barriers are required 
(Vegvesen, 2006)  
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As shown in Figure 1 the tunnel passes beneath a populated area of the city. Therefore (1) the 
largest part of the tunnel and its ramps were sealed against potential leakages of water and liquids 
(especially in the west side of the project, due to the major population in the Møllenberg area); and, 
(2) different earthquake tests were executed to guarantee reliability of the tunnel and safety along 
the residents of the area above. The following list summarizes the relevant facts of the tunnel 
(Vegvesen, 2014b): 
 Total length: 2502 m (including the concrete tunnel in both ends) 
 Two separated roads with two lanes in each direction 
 Length: Mountain tunnel with four lanes for two directions (2134 m and 2120 m). In 
addition, to tunnel ramps of 367 m and 387 m 
 Width: 2 x T9.5 main entrances and 2 x T7 ramp tunnels 
 Lowest point: Lowest blasted point was located 22 m under the sea level. After 
completion, the lowest point of the road lies 15 m under the sea level 
 Mountain blasted: 387.000 dm3 (bedrock), 696.000 dm3 (loose rock). Approximately 
600.000 dm3 were deposited in the development area of Grillstadfæra 
 Extensive and time consuming pre-injection 
 Dense area above: residential buildings across the tunnel 
1.1.2 Dovrebanen Project 
The second completed tunnel was part of the E6-Dovrebanen project. This project was a 
cooperative project between SVV and JBV. These national organizations simultaneously 
developed works in the road and railway system along Minnesund and Kleverud. The reasons to 
join forces were: (1) the E6 motorway and the Dovrebanen railway lie very close to each other 
(Vianova), and (2) the jointly organization was intended to provide: savings in the construction 
costs, environmental development, technical collaboration and future operational gains (AS, 2011).   
Although, both sub-projects (railway and road) were deployed in the same stretch, each of them 
had its own characteristics and were part of different larger projects in the region (Figure 2 exhibits 
the final design of the stretch). In fact, SVV as part of the E6 Gardemoen – Biri project developed 
a new four-lane road of approximately 21.6 km between the Hobart and Stange municipalities. 
From this path, 3.76 km consisted of tunnel roads that connected Minnesund and Labbdalen with 
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the current E6. On the other hand, JBV as part of the Eidsvoll – Hammar project built a double 
lane railway of approximately 16.6 km in the stretch between Eidsvoll and Hamar. From this path, 
4.6 km were tunnel roads. The project upgraded the single railway between Minnesud and 
Kleverud, and connected 76.200 km of existing railway in the south and 93.210 km in the north. It 
was built for a speed of 200 km/h, and can be used by regional, long distance, freight and high-
speed trains. Moreover, the project also included the construction of over 20 km of local roads and 
19 km of bike and walking paths, two-level intersections with acceleration lanes, culverts and 
pedestrian bridges (AS, 2011; Jerbaneverket & AS, 2011; Vianova).  
 
Figure 2 - Graphical overview of the road and railway design (Vianova) 
Due to the size and novelty of the project, the management decided to split the stretch in three 
parts. Each part was assigned to a different company (Parcel 1: Vianova; Parcel 2: Cowi; Parcel 3: 
Norconsult), which individually designed and modelled their part. Then, their designs were 
integrated in a collaboration model - achieving common goals of collaboration, quality assurance 
and savings along the processes (Vianova). Furthermore, each part was constructed by a different 
company (Parcel 1: Alpine Bau GmbH; Parcel 2: Veidekke Hochtief and Parcel 3: Hæhre 
Entreprenør. Figure 3 shows the stretch of the project and how was it divided along the different 
contractors: 
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Figure 3 - Project path & Contract division (Vegvesen & Jerbaneverket, 2015) 
As follows the main factors of the project (Vegvesen & Jerbaneverket): 
 It’s the largest of its kind in the Norwegian history (Cost: 7,9 billion NOK) 
 Construction time: E6 – 30 months / Dovrebanen – 42 months 
 The E6 roadway and the Dovre railway line are very close to each other 
 The simultaneous construction was expected to save 400 million NOK (compared to an 
independent scenario) 
 The project was divided in three different contracts: (1) 6 km long, including a road and 
rail tunnel (both 600 m); (2) 6 km long, including a 2.3 km road tunnel and two rail tunnels 
(4 km and 150 m length); (3) 10 km of the E6 with a 700 m tunnel, and 5 km of the Dovre 
line.  
1.1.3 Helltunnel 
The Ranheim – Værnes project arose from the following factors: First, the current road 
infrastructure is presenting capacity problems and the traffic forecasts have shown a dramatic 
increase in the near future. Especially, regarding freight traffic and, passengers from and towards 
the Værnes airport.  Second, insufficient capacity on the railways, thus the difficultness to move 
the traffic from the road to the railway system. Third, the single lane road (in certain traces of the 
stretch) has contributed to accidents and additional costs. Fourth, the travel time could be reduced 
if the E6 is expanded to a four-lane road. Fifth, the current tunnels are not fulfilling the EU safety 
regulations (Vegvesen & Jerbaneverket, 2011). These reasons sustain the development of the 
project. It consists of 23.1 km of road extension (four-lane road) along the E6 stretch, and includes 
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the construction of three tunnels, from which derives the Helltunnel - the longest with 3.9 km. The 
Helltunnel starts in Hommelvik (Malvik kommune) and comes out in Hellstranda; its construction 
is planned to last 4.5 years. Figure 4 exhibits the project path:  
 
Figure 4 - Ranheim Værnes Project (Statens Vegvesen, 2015) 
At the moment, SVV is considering two alternatives for the stretch of the tunnel: (1) the seaside 
and (2) landside alternatives. Both have advantages and disadvantages, but there are critical factors 
that could influence the decision process between the alternatives. In particular, in a project of these 
characteristics that is influenced by multiple variables and actors.  As follows the main 
characteristics of the Helltunnel (Vegvesen, 2014a): 
 Total length: 3910 m 
 8 emergency exits contemplated 
 Maximum speed: 90 km/h 
 Expected masses extracted from the mountain: 324.480 m3 
 Tunnel class E2 
 Tunnel profile T10.5 
                                                 
2 Class E: It must have accidents niches every 500 m, cross connections every 250 m, emergency station per lane 
with one emergency phone and 2 fire extinguishers every 125 m (Vegvesen, 2006) 
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1.2 Scope 
The initial scope of the study was oriented towards the uncertain factors involved in the 
development of a tunnel project. The idea was to identify those unknown factors that are difficult 
to foresee, and that influence dramatically the cost of the project. However, after reviewing 
literature and during one of the introductory meetings with the organization, SVV decided to 
narrow down the scope with a list of components that were established as the areas of interested 
for the company. These components are factors of the cost estimate; and were selected by SVV 
due to their impact in the final cost, and the complexity that their calculation entail. Here a brief 
description of them: 
1. Disposal of masses: In the tunnel excavation a large amount of masses are extracted. 
The engineers run mathematical models to estimate the amount of masses that will be 
extracted from the tunnel. In addition, every mountain is composed by different types 
of masses and rocks (usable and unusable materials). In short, the project organization 
is in charge of handling and relocating an uncertain amount of different (unknown) type 
of masses. Perhaps, the above stated gives some idea of the enormity of the task (Jupp, 
2003).  
 
2. Rigging: this factor relates specifically to the number of rigging sites used to drill the 
tunnel. Depending on the conditions and surroundings of the project, the construction 
managers can / cannot have multiple sites of operation. The importance of this factor 
relies on the effect in the costs and time of construction of the project.  
 
3. Project Management: The project management is a matter of robust decisions, rather 
than optimal decisions. The reason is that in order to have the project rolling, decisions 
have to be made without all the required information (Winch, 2010). In addition, the 
project involves multiple stakeholder with different interests. Therefore, the 
coordination of the processes and parties must be handled. 
 
4. Environmental Measures: the project must avoid or minimize the damages or changes 
in the environment. Each project is deployed in a different area and under different 
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conditions. These factors portray the challenges and risks related to the conservation of 
the environment surrounding the construction.  
 
5. Mountain Quality: Our world is made up of different kinds of fluids and solids (Jupp, 
2003). Therefore, tunnel projects are always challenged by the quality of the mountain. 
Once again, any new tunnel faces different conditions along the area where they have 
to drill. In addition, the quality of the mountain has direct effects in multiple variables 
such as techniques, tools, project time, resources, equipment, etc.  
 
6. Time of Construction: This factor is perhaps the major concern of the stakeholders 
involved in the project. It has direct relationship with core facts of the project; among 
them, one can reference the quality of the tunnel, the cost of the project, and the positive 
and negative effects to residents of the area. In addition, multiple variables can 
accelerate or delay the course of a project.  
 
7. Work restrictions: Once more, every projects has / has not work restrictions depending 
on the area where it is developed. This factor is highly relevant in order to plan and 
estimate the amount of resources for the project. Moreover, additional measures have 
to be taken in case there are residents in the proximities of the construction. Likewise, 
with the traffic and the commercial ventures operating in the zone. In effect, this last 
factor has major influence in the project development. 
These components of the cost estimate were the factors studied under this research. Due to the 
exploratory nature of this investigation, we aimed to grasp as much knowledge and valuable 
information from the existing sources. Similarly, by request of SVV another task was appointed. 
They had two alternatives for the path of the tunnel (Helltunnel): the seaside and landside. SVV 
requested us to evaluate and measure both options based on the findings from the research. In that 
line, the alternatives were assessed through the components established by them. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of the present master thesis is to provide insights and recommendations for the 
cost estimation process (P50) of the new Helltunnel in the Ranheim - Værnes project. Based on the 
cost estimate components defined by SVV, we sought to: 
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1) Comprehend the characteristics and challenges involved in a tunnel construction project 
(by a conscious literature review) 
2) Comprehend the definition, processes involved and hidden factors along the tasks defined 
by SVV 
3) Identify the most relevant certain/uncertain factors and their mitigation methodologies in 
tunnel projects from the completed projects 
4) Map and transfer the successful strategies and practices used in the completed projects 
5) Comprehend the advantages and disadvantages of both alternatives for the new tunnel 
6) Collect and transfer the advantages and benefits of each of the alternatives for the new 
tunnel 
1.4 Limitations 
The study is limited by: (1) the availability and veracity of the information, given that certain bias 
and barriers might affect the quality of the information provided by the personnel (main source for 
the data collecting process). (2) Since the concept of the project is to take the lessons learned from 
specifically two completed projects from SVV, the potential insights might be framed to the 
characteristics of the organization and the events that happened in these former experiences. In 
other words, the experiences can be very context specific. Nevertheless, additional information and 
knowledge from external sources will complement and filter the final recommendations.  
1.5 Structure of the report 
The report is structured in the following order: 
1) Chapter 1 – Introduction: describes the background, objectives and limitations of the report. 
It serves as preamble for the reader to enter in context.   
 
2) Chapter 2 – Literature review: summarizes and connects the literature reviewed with the 
investigation. 
 
3) Chapter 3 – Research Methodology: explains the research methodology, research 
questions, research design, and quality and ethical guidelines of the report.  
 
4) Chapter 4 – Results and Findings: presents and discusses the findings of the research.  
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5) Chapter 5 – Discussion: presents our insights and recommendations for the on-going cost 
estimate process for the Helltunnel.  
 
6) Chapter 6 – Conclusions  
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2. Literature Review 
In this chapter, a brief summary of the literature reviewed for the research is presented. The chapter 
starts with the definition and linkage of Risk & Uncertainty management. Hence, we continue with 
the concept of lessons learned in projects, with an additional description of the reference class 
forecasting. Finally, we conclude with the literature review about tunneling projects and its 
uncertain factors. 
2.1 Project Risk & Uncertainty Management 
2.1.1 Project Risk Management 
Since its creation in 1950s, the project risk management (PRM) discipline has been transformed 
into multiple approaches along these years of evolution (Perminova et al., 2008). The traditional 
PRM is a systematic process of identifying, analyzing and responding to risk as project-related 
events and managerial behaviors, which have the potential for adverse consequences but have not 
been identified in advance (Committee, 2004). That is to say, PRM turns to be a “tool against 
threats” aimed to identify, foresee and treat the negative events that could harm the processes along 
the Project life Cycle (PLC)3 (Ramgopal, 2003; Ward & Chapman, 2003). This process promotes 
the planning tool as the base of its activities - risk identification, analysis, monitoring and control 
-  and aims to assure conformance in cost, time and scope (Kutsch & Hall, 2010; Perminova, 2011; 
Perminova et al., 2008). These practices are aligned with the activities promoted by the traditional 
PM.  
On the other hand, the non-traditional scholars interpret risk as one of the implications of 
uncertainty (Chapman & Ward, 2002, 2004; Perminova et al., 2008; Ward & Chapman, 2003). 
Namely, uncertainty could be positive (opportunity factors) and negative (risk factors) for a project. 
However, both might have consequences if they occur (Rolstadås, Hetland, Jergeas, & Westney, 
2011). Moreover, they complement the traditional theory with the following insights: (1) they 
understand that projects are dynamic in nature, thus risk management must take into account both, 
the positive and negative consequences of an event (Sanchez, Robert, Bourgault, & Pellerin, 2009); 
(2) the focus on “events” and “circumstances” along the classical theories is extended to the 
“anything that lacks certainty” should be consider uncertain; and, (3) the risk and opportunity 
                                                 
3 Project Life Cycle: The project life cycle consists on the phases of a project since its beginning until its end. The 
phases are: front-end phase, implementation phase and operational phase (Samset, 2010).  
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management is seen as an on-going process throughout the project, rather than only during the 
early stages of it. These above-described interpretations are part of the so-called “Uncertainty 
Management” (UM) (Chapman & Ward, 2011; Jaafari, 2001; Perminova et al., 2008; Ward & 
Chapman, 2003). 
For our report, given that projects are on-going processes subject to changes due to external factors, 
changing objectives and poor methods (Jaafari, 2001; R. Turner & Müller, 2003). We agreed with 
Chapman & Ward (2004) that the best practice in risk management is concerned to the management 
of uncertainty, especially along projects. Therefore, we oriented the literature review towards this 
methodology. 
   
2.1.2 Project Uncertainty Management 
PUM emerged under the assumption that planning at an early stage is necessary, but not sufficient 
for project success (Andersen, 1996). It aims to explore and understand the uncertainty linked to 
the project (Ramgopal, 2003) and, it involves more than the combination of risk and opportunity 
management (Ward & Chapman, 2003). As stated by Ward & Chapman (2003): “It is not just about 
managing perceived threats, opportunities and their implications. It is about identifying and 
managing all the many sources of uncertainty which give rise to and shape our perceptions of 
threats and opportunities. It implies exploring and understanding the origins of project uncertainty 
before seeking to manage it, with no preconceptions about what is desirable or undesirable” (Ward 
& Chapman, 2003, p. 98). In that sense, perhaps the major difference between the traditional PRM 
and the UM, is that the latter seeks to continuously understand Why and Where questions along 
the uncertain (risk + opportunities) factors throughout project. As follows, Table 1 describes the 
main values and assumptions of the UM methodology: 
Criteria UM 
Activities / Strategies 
(1) Proactive management leads to benefits beyond improved 
control and neutralization of threats (Perminova, 2011; 
Ramgopal, 2003) 
 
(2) Reflective processes emphasizing flexibility and learning – 
competitive advantage (Loch, Solt, & Bailey, 2008) 
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(3) Understand how and why the different aspects of UM apply 
to different stages of the project (Chapman & Ward, 2011) 
 
(4) Judging the source and relevance of the information received 
(Perminova et al., 2008) 
 
(5) Understanding objectives and purposes of the key actors. 
Incentive the communication among them (Perminova et al., 
2008) 
 
(6) Integrate the UM with the other PM activities at an early 
stage of the project (Perminova et al., 2008) 
 
(7) Identifying contextual uncertainty by environmental 
scanning and analytical models (Perminova et al., 2008) 
Assumptions 
(1) Project and its environment is under constant change, so the 
uncertainty management has to be applied along the 
complete project - ongoing process (Perminova et al., 2008) 
 
(2) "Projects have constraints and unclear areas, that neither the 
customer nor the company are able to recognize at an early 
stage" (Perminova, 2011) 
 
(3) Assumes variability in performance measures like cost, time, 
and quality (Ward & Chapman, 2003) 
 
(4) It is not possible to foresee all the threats and opportunities at 
the planning phase (Andersen, 1996) 
 
(5) Projects are unique only to a certain extent. A number of risk 
to occur, are similar from project to project (Perminova, 
2011) 
 
(6) Uncertainty becomes either a risk or an opportunity. It 
cannot be eliminated completely (Perminova et al., 2008) 
 
(7) PM skills are essential to understand and manage 
uncertainty. The experience and expertise facilitates the 
identification process (Perminova et al., 2008) 
 
Table 1 - Activities and assumptions of the UM 
To conclude, we can summarize the principal benefits provided by this methodology: 
 Increased flexibility and response of implementation (Perminova, 2011) 
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 Better way to manage the unforeseen and unexpected situations presented in the projects 
(Perminova, 2011) 
 Unlimited contribution to the project performance through the “risk + opportunities” 
identification (Ward & Chapman, 2003) 
 Attention to important areas of the project related to uncertainty: variability, basis of the 
estimates, assumptions, appropriate objectives and associated trade-offs (Ward & 
Chapman, 2003) 
 Better understanding of the interrelations between the elements and environments along the 
project (Perminova, 2011) 
 UM facilitates the integration with PM in an early stage of the PLC (Ward & Chapman, 
2003) 
 Well-founded trust based on a clear thinking and communication through appropriate 
analysis and documentation (Chapman & Ward, 2011) 
In regards to our research, we set special attention to the continuous reflecting learning and 
information sharing activities aimed to reduce and cope the project uncertainty. These strategies 
are the key elements to increase the flexibility and the rapidness of the decision-making in response 
to uncertain situations (Osipova & Eriksson, 2013; Perminova et al., 2008). Accordingly, the 
“lessons learned” strategy was chosen to reduce the uncertainty of the topic under study.  
2.2 Lessons Learned in Projects 
Projects are by nature temporary organizations, which develop temporary and unique processes 
with non-routine features, hindering learning. Moreover, projects cut across organizational 
functions and the knowledge produced is transdisciplinary and created in the context of application 
(Williams, 2008). In addition to these internal characteristics, projects involve multiple challenges 
and are influenced by external factors (competition, alliances, contractual issues, time, etc.) 
(Jugdev, 2012). All these above aspects are part of the uncertainty sources along project-based 
organizations. In consequence, strategies are needed to mitigate the risks and exploit the 
opportunities derived from the uncertainty. For our research, the “lessons learned” (LL) strategy 
was selected to approach the two completed projects under study. This strategy seeks for 
organizational success through the collection and dissemination of knowledge (Williams, 2008). 
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But, what are the LL? What are its challenges and shortcomings? What are its benefits? How is the 
knowledge extracted? 
To answer the above questions, we started referencing the definition of LL established by two 
scholars: 
“Lessons learned are an efficient and effective way of transferring valuable project 
knowledge-the good, the bad and the ugly. Lessons learned involve sharing knowledge 
about the elements of specific project phases that went according to plan, the parts that 
could be improved on and plans to address these issues before moving on to the next phase” 
(Jugdev, 2012, p. 13).  
 
“Lessons learned are defined as key project experiences which have a certain general 
business relevance for future projects. They have been validated by a project team and 
represent a consensus on a key insight that should be considered in future projects” 
(Schindler & Eppler, 2003, p. 20) 
 
Summarizing, lessons learned aim to collect and use the knowledge gained after experimenting the 
development of a project(s). The following section illustrates the barriers of the methodology.  
2.2.1 Barriers 
This strategy has been present in the PM theory for a long period, but its practice is generally 
resisted and superficially executed (Jugdev, 2012). Relevant knowledge gained from project to 
project is: 
(1) not always documented or communicated to further use (Jugdev, 2012); 
(2) primarily transferred verbally along a limited group of people (Kartam, 1996); 
(3) at risk due to the conflicting aims between the surrounding organization and the project 
under development (Schindler & Eppler, 2003). 
 In addition, it has been mainly focused in the collection of quantitative knowledge – explicit 
knowledge (costs, timelines, etc.), which is easy to get and document. Whereas, the tacit knowledge 
– know how/know why – used to answer the “why” and “how” questions, has been widely neglected 
and only in recent years the attention has shifted towards it (Schindler & Eppler, 2003). In fact, 
during the investigation it was complicated to extract the tacit knowledge from the informants. We 
were required to insist and dig for details in every question asked, due to their tendency of providing 
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explicit and general knowledge. In conclusion, effective LL is through continuous learning and 
improvement of PM practices and processes based on explicit and tacit knowledge (Williams, 
2004).  
Moreover, the extracting of knowledge from the experts is perhaps the most difficult step in the LL 
process (Kartam, 1996). In general, the relevant project documentation – explicit knowledge 
(feasibility study, summary, technical report, cost estimate, etc.) has to be produced to fulfill the 
documentation standards and to show the project results. This information is often superficial and 
resolves the “What”, “Where” and “How many” questions. Whereas, the tacit knowledge – 
experiences - is bound to the people who were personally involved in the corresponding problem-
solving processes and is not part of the project’s documentation. Usually, these people move into 
other project or are reintegrated to their line functions as soon as the project is delivered. Then, the 
organizational amnesia begins (Schindler & Eppler, 2003). Therefore, the importance of applying 
an effective method to extract the information from the experts. According to Kartam (1996): 
“The experience and knowledge in engineering has shown that personal interviews, rather 
than pure questionnaires, is the most effective method of knowledge acquisition. The 
interview process itself is critical to understanding how successful project superintendents 
approach their business. It allows insight into how project superintendents categorize, 
organize, and use their rich experience. Heuristics, or rules of thumb, are plentiful in 
construction but difficult to articulate.” (Kartam, 1996, p. 19).  
2.2.2 Advantages 
LL has been recognized as a success factor / best practice among PM scholars (Cooke-Davies & 
Arzymanow, 2003; Menke, 1997). The following list enumerates the main advantages of the LL 
strategy: 
 Benefits involve money saved and earned. Its calculations may also be indirect through 
improvements in measures like cycle time, customer satisfaction, or even calls averted 
(Davenport, De Long, & Beers, 1998) 
 Achieving good results at the operational level (Jugdev, 2012) 
 Enhances a company’s competitive advantage based on the knowledge-based practices 
(Jugdev, 2012; Schindler & Eppler, 2003) 
 LL involves formal/informal workplace learning and explicit/tacit knowledge sharing 
(Jugdev, 2012) 
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 PM learn how to manage experimentally, therefore is important to reflect and learn from 
these lessons (J. R. Turner et al., 2000) 
 No extra costs due to redundant work and repetition of mistakes (Schindler & Eppler, 2003) 
 Continuous learning and improvement are set as the highest level of project management 
maturity (Harold, 2000) 
 The knowledge and experiences are collected and could be disseminated along the 
organization when necessary (Schindler & Eppler, 2003) 
 The repetitiveness of LL procedures at different stages of the project is the core element in 
success of PRM practices (Brady, Davies, & Hobday, 2006) 
 
Finally, we had the certainty that the lessons learned strategy and the interviewing method were 
the right tools to investigate the uncertain factors involved in the tunnel projects. Yet, the objective 
of SVV is to improve their cost estimates; hence, we described the “Reference Class Forecasting 
- (RCF)” established by Flyvbjerg in the following section. This theory is based on LL thinking 
and seeks to develop better forecasts.  
 
2.3 Reference Class Forecasting 
According to Flyvbjerg, the forecasts of cost have remained constantly and remarkably inaccurate 
for decades. No improvement in accuracy seems to have taken place, despite the substantial 
resources spent over decades and the claims of better data, improved models, etc. (Bruzelius, 
Flyvbjerg, & Rothengatter, 2002; Flyvbjerg, Skamris holm, & Buhl, 2003; Flyvbjerg, Skamris 
Holm, & Buhl, 2005). The information used to decide whether to invest in new projects is highly 
inaccurate and biased making projects highly risky, and as a consequence, the estimates of viability 
- socioeconomical and environmental - are often misleading (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The above indicates 
that something other than poor data or models is affecting the accuracy of the estimates. Flyvbjerg 
concludes that the problem can be accounted to the following two explanations: 
(1) Psychological explanations: “Inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias. That is, cognitive 
predisposition found with most people to judge future events in a more positive light than 
is warranted by actual experience” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 4). 
(2) Political explanations: “Inaccuracy in terms of strategic misrepresentation. Here, when 
forecasting the outcomes of the project, forecasters and managers deliberately and 
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strategically overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs in order to increase the 
likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and 
funding” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 4-5) . 
 
His work showed that errors of judgement are: (1) Systematic and predictable; (2) Manifesting bias 
rather than confusion; (3) Shared by experts and alike people (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Consequently, 
Flyvbjerg established the RCF. This methodology aligned to LL, seeks for accuracy by basing 
forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects. As a result, optimism 
bias and strategic misrepresentation are significantly reduced (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Flyvberg argues 
that while planning a new project most individuals are inclined to adopt an inside view. Which 
means, that they focus in the project itself and its unique features (requirements, resources, 
deadlines, etc.), trying to predict the events that will influence its future. Thus, biased and 
overoptimistic forecasts are established.  However, when the project managers and forecasters 
examine the outside view. They examine the experience(s) of similar projects and establish a series 
of outcomes from this reference class, so the created scenarios and invented events are not 
necessary. Hence, more accurate forecasts are developed (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Figure 5 exhibits a 
graphical illustration of the reference class forecasting: 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Illustration of the reference class forecasting (Flyvbjerg, 2006) 
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The rational base guiding the scope of our report is aligned to the Reference class forecasting theory 
stated by Flyvbjerg (2006) in: “From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right”. 
We took the outside view to investigate two completed and similar projects; hence, we translate 
the lessons learned and success factors to help SVV to structure a more accurate cost estimate for 
the on-going project. 
 
2.4 Tunneling projects  
To start, we cited the definition of tunnels given by Fouladgar et al. (2012): 
“Tunnels are artificial underground space in order to provide a capacity for particular 
goals such as storage, underground transportation, mine development, power and water 
treatment plants, civil defense, and other activities. Therefore, tunneling is a key activity 
in infrastructure projects” (Fouladgar, Yazdani-Chamzini, & Zavadskas, 2012)  
Moreover, we considered important to understand why road-tunneling projects are being developed 
worldwide. What are the benefits of these constructions? Why tunnels instead of regular roads? In 
general, road systems must fulfill the following four basic conditions: (1) efficient transport, (2) 
modest construction and maintenance costs, (3) preservation of the environment and (4) high safety 
standards (NFF). These conditions are difficult to accomplish given the amount of variables that 
are implied in these projects. To illustrate, a road with low construction costs and efficient transport 
could be planned over a preserved area with major construction restrictions. Indeed, the definition 
of the “perfect” solution could be a complex decision-making process. Nonetheless, the society 
requires an appropriate road system, so certain trade-offs have to be made. Hence, the relevance of 
tunneling projects. These road systems eliminate conflicts regarding difficult topography (shorten 
road routes / development without undue injury to the landscape), urban areas (spare existing 
buildings and valuable sites whilst permitting roads to be built along the most convenient routes) 
and aesthetic appeal (NFF). In Norway, the majority of tunneling projects have been developed in 
the rural districts, due to light traffic and low-cost design to reduce construction costs (Øvstedal). 
In addition, they were considered risky and inconvenient to the road system. Nevertheless, 
nowadays tunnels are being incorporated to heavily built-up areas, given the gradually change of 
mentality and the current lower construction costs (NFF). 
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On the other hand, we considered the construction process highly relevant to understand the 
technical terms and implications of the tunneling projects. Then, based on the “artificial 
underground space” remark in the tunnel definition, it is immediately clear that the first step in the 
construction process is related to the geological investigations (pre-studies) required to assure the 
feasibility of the project. These investigations are carried continuously during the construction, and 
all the information is integrated to structure the PM, engineering and design plans (Arestegui, 2014; 
Read, 2004). Relying on this information, the decision-makers decide whether to execute the 
project or not. Once approved, the tunneling construction process could be described with the 
following four activities (Arestegui, 2014):  
 Excavation: is the process of removing the rock and soil from the stretch where the tunnel 
will be constructed. It has to be continuous, thus complementary activities such as scaling, 
loading, hauling are involved. It is essential to design a spoil removal system with the 
sufficient capacity to extract the outputs from the excavation (Read, 2004). 
 Ground Water Inflow Control: the water inflow have consequences for the construction 
and operation of the tunnels. The addition of water can dramatically and adversely affect 
the properties of soft ground strata4. Hence, the soils exhibiting this condition have to be 
controlled. These control activities are extremely expensive and, as they are not 
guaranteed, are a potential risk (Read, 2004). 
 
 Rock Mass Support: process where the rock mass is stabilized in order to establish a new 
equilibrium condition in the modified rock or soil. It is performed behind the tunnel face 
and provides the equilibrium required to ensure the level of safety necessary for 
operations in the facility (Arestegui, 2014; Jupp, 2003).  
 
 Lining: the lining methods are the permanent support methods for the tunnel. They are 
aimed to provide safety in the construction site and avoid collapses in the tunnel (Toma). 
Although, lining is generally required along the stretch of the tunnel, when the tunnel 
                                                 
4 Strata: is a layer of sedimentary rock or soil with internally consistent characteristics that distinguish it from other 
layers 
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section passes across weak zones (heavy rock fall, massive swelling zones, highly crushed 
rock, and zones with water leakage problems) the lining processes are reinforced. It may 
also be considered as part of the rock support, water control system and the structural 
design (Arestegui, 2014; Read, 2004).  
These activities are highly sensitive to disturbances, because of the: (1) serial nature of the 
tunneling processes, thus, there is limited capacity to change workplace or to perform parallel 
activities – Figure 6 (Isaksson & Stille, 2005) (2) Geological and construction uncertainties 
involved in this type of projects (Arestegui, 2014).  
 
Figure 6 - Tunneling process 
As stated above, the nature/characteristics of these projects imply considerable uncertainties and 
challenges when developing such constructions (Eskesen, Tengborg, Kampmann, & Veicherts, 
2004). In that line, the following section elaborates into the main uncertain factors in tunnel 
projects. 
2.5 Uncertain Factors in Tunnel Projects 
Tunnel projects are often large and require major capital expenditures, clearly, several parties and 
processes are involved in the process (Isaksson, 2002). There are internal and external uncertainties 
challenging the project completion. By internal, we mean the uncertainties related to the project 
construction itself, such as ground and groundwater conditions, construction-related risk factors 
and performance risk factors (efficiency of workers and equipment). Whereas by external, we mean 
the external uncertainties that influence the project development, such as: laws, media, politicians, 
regulations, community involvement, environmental constraints and time frame provided by the 
clients or financers (Eskesen et al., 2004; Isaksson, 2002; Isaksson & Stille, 2005; JJ Reilly, 2000). 
4. Linning
3. Rock 
Support
2. Water 
Control
1. Excavation
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In fact, tunnels are developed over an uncertainty context, in which opportunities and risks are 
presented since the conception of the project idea (JJ Reilly, 2000). Nevertheless, for our research 
the focus is oriented towards the main uncertainties identified after the interviewing process and 
scoped with the areas of interested established by SVV. As follows, the description of these factors: 
2.5.1 Ground and groundwater conditions 
The process of digging a tunnel is not as simple as deciding where the tunnel will be located and, 
then blasting the way through. Bickel (1996) established the general uncertainties and unknowns 
when dealing with underground projects (Bickel, 1996): 
 The overriding uncertainty when dealing with any underground project.  
 The geology of the area will determine the feasibility and the cost of the undertaking.  
 Engineering properties of rock may change (sometimes drastically) with a wide range of 
conditions, notably time, season, rate and direction of loading. 
 Groundwater is the most difficult parameter to predict and the most troublesome during 
construction.  
 Drilling core, the most common method of determining underground conditions, only 
recovers less than 0.0005% of the excavated volume of the tunnel on a typical project in 
the most exhaustive survey, which leaves a great deal of room for uncertainty. 
The interpretation of the geological conditions is not a precise science, the presence of multiple 
problems and challenges (flammable gases, deoxygenated air, contaminated ground, water tables, 
etc.) in the construction area, entail big uncertainties for the project (Read, 2004). As stated by 
Pennington (2011): “The greatest technical and financial risks for any tunnel project can almost 
always be traced to the variability and uncertainty associated with the ground” (Pennington, 2011, 
p. 107). Moreover, based on the ground information the project team defines the: (1) Suitability – 
suitability of the site and appropriateness of the proposed works; (2) Design – enable an adequate 
and economic design; (3) Construction – define the best construction method based on the project 
conditions; (4) Effect to change – establish the effects and changes in the ground and environment 
that may arise with the project (during construction and after delivering); and (5) Choice of site - 
advise the best site alternative for the project (Read, 2004). Clearly, the majority of processes 
involved in the tunnel construction are structured with the information gathered from the site 
investigations. Although, these investigations should be ongoing throughout the planning and 
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design phases, and, should continue during the construction process; they are limited due to the 
high investment required - schedule and financial. In addition, it is important to have in mind that 
these investigation techniques cannot always predict the ground conditions along the tunnel 
alignment (Pennington, 2011). Therefore, it is difficult for a decision maker to create a structured 
picture of the complete problem (Chapman & Ward, 2002). Figure 7 illustrates the reduction of 
risk through the gathering of more data:   
 
Figure 7 - Level of risk as a function of the investment in site investigations (Pennington, 2011, p. 84) 
As follows, the principal uncertainties identified with respect to the ground conditions: 
 Soil characterization: The soil conditions must be carefully assessed in order to anticipate 
possible face instabilities, particularly in cohesionless soils below the water table, soft 
clays, silts and mixed soils. The objective is to assure stability of the excavated bore and 
avoid damages to surface structures/services or to the miners and machinery (Read, 2004) 
(See Appendix C - soil testing for ground investigations). 
 
 Rock characterization: The identification and classification of rocks is extremely complex, 
much more that for soils. Rock is a treacherous medium to work and even the "solid" rock 
often contains innumerable cracks, faults, number and type of layers, folds, and 
discontinuities. Its mechanical characteristics are dominated by the effect of anisotropy5 
and the discontinuities contained within. The activation of any of these characteristics by 
                                                 
5 Anisotropy: the state of a characteristic of the rock being different in different directions (Marie) 
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the excavation process (induces stresses and displacements onto the existing structures) 
could trigger to a collapse of the tunnel (Lo, 2011; Marie). These wide variety of must 
account in the design and construction process of the tunnel (Matsumoto & Nishioka, 
1991). According to Read (2004), an appropriate ground characterization is essential to 
properly evaluate the selection of: (1) type of tunnel excavation method; (2) requirements 
for ground stability control or conditioning; (3) tunnel vertical alignment; and (4) the length, 
strength and type of tunnel lining (Read, 2004). Different characteristics demand different 
mechanisms and techniques to execute the tunneling process (excavation, water control, 
rock support and lining) (Arestegui, 2014; Pennington, 2011). Clearly, the evaluation of 
these characteristics in the mechanical principles determine the feasibility, design and 
construction methods, and the stability of the tunnel once excavated (Marie). Simplifying, 
the most important requirement that the rock must fulfill when excavated is its ability to 
remain stable (sounds simple, it is not always the case). Hence, the rocks have to be testes 
and further classified on the basis of resistance to deformation (Strength), and amount and 
resistance to weathering (Marie).  
 
 Weakness and Fault Zones: Locally-significant deviations in the geological conditions 
(Isaksson & Stille, 2005). Its  identification is crucial and must include the gouge material 
characterization (Arestegui, 2014).  
 
 Water Inflow: As stated before, the addition of water can dramatically and adversely affect 
the construction and operation process of the tunnel (Read, 2004). Hence, the expected 
volume of water has to be estimated and its control measures early defined. Variables as 
the pressure and chemical conditions of the water have to be taken into account (Arestegui, 
2014). Groundwater control can be in the form of impermeable membranes, sealing gaskets, 
or during construction using pre-excavation grouting. The degree of water tightness 
required will depend on the intended function of the tunnel (Read, 2004) (See Appendix D 
- water tightness requirements) 
 
 Disposal of materials: Linked to the material characterization, emerge the designated areas 
to relocate the materials extracted from the construction site. The areas are regulated and 
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the project team has to process permits based on the amount and type of materials extracted 
from the project (Read, 2004). These arrangements and plans are structured on the ground 
composition information collected in the Front-End phase. However as we have discussed 
above, there is not 100% certainty regarding the amount and type of materials that will be 
extracted from the construction area. Although, the sites and its characteristics are selected 
with the best information available, it is likely that the team has to make new arrangements 
at a higher cost. 
2.5.2 Project Management 
According to Reilly (2000), the owner and public expectations are that the tunnel will: (1) be 
completed on time; (2) be completed within budget; (3) serve its intended purpose; (4) satisfy all 
its constituents (“Stakeholders”) (JJ Reilly, 2000). These four conditions illustrate the complex 
challenge for the parties involved in the project. The project management processes are structured 
based on the information collected in the feasibility phase of the project. This information is/could 
be highly inaccurate and biased. Thus, the plans and operations have to be thoroughly analyzed, 
and buffers/alternatives must be deployed (Arestegui, 2014; Flyvbjerg, 2006).  In that line, the 
success of a project lies directly with the project management appointment. PM is responsible to 
complete the project at cost, within the time scheduled and with the technical specifications 
required (Read, 2004).  
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3. Research Methodology  
The following chapter presents the methodology, methods, quality criteria, limitations and ethical 
guidelines selected to develop this study. Given that the selection of the research methodology 
affects and influences the quality of the study, the author considered highly relevant to build this 
chapter utilizing theoretical aspects supporting the suitability and appropriateness of the chosen 
methodology. In addition, the quality assurance strategies and limitations of the research are 
described.  
3.1 Research Methodology Selection 
The investigation aimed to collect the lessons and knowledge learned in the two completed projects 
(Strindheim tunnel and Dovrebanen tunnel) regarding the areas of interest defined by SVV. In that 
sense, we sought to: (1) explore and comprehend the hidden relations, interactions, 
communications, events, constraints, opportunities and factors among the actors and processes 
within these, and thus (2) transfer these knowledge and lessons learned to the cost estimate 
assessment for a new tunnel (Helltunnel, Ranheim - Værnes project). That is to say, decode and 
translate (solving “How” and “Why” questions) the uncertain factors involved in the cost 
estimation; rather than measuring or quantifying the frequency or results of events. Henceforth, we 
require a qualitative research methodology. This methodology strives to achieve in-depth 
understanding and facilitates the exploration of the multiple facets of a phenomenon through a 
variety of lenses and perspectives (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Cooper & Schindler, 2006; Yin, 2013). 
For our study the phenomenon under study were the uncertain factors involved in the cost estimate 
process for tunnel projects; and the multiple facets were the different components (areas of interest) 
defined by SVV. In that sense and given the exploratory nature of the research, we used a 
qualitative phenomenology methodology to explore the phenomena by exploring the “lived 
experiences” of individuals (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). For our research, it was explored by 
collecting and analyzing the lessons learned of the project practitioners from the two completed 
tunnels. After the definition of the methodology, the following section describes the research 
questions for the study.  
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3.2 Research Questions 
Once defined the research methodology, we needed to set limits and encircle the investigation. 
Thus, we developed a series of research questions that helped us to stick to the objective outlined 
and to guide the process. As follows the list of questions: 
1) Which were the uncertain factors influencing the cost estimate components defined by 
SVV in the completed project(s)? 
2) What are the key practices and strategies to reduce the uncertainty in the estimation of the 
components defined by SVV in the completed project(s)? 
3) Based on the experiences with the completed tunnel project(s), which are the advantages 
and disadvantages of the potential alternatives (sea tunnel and land tunnel) for the new 
project? 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design introduces a framework to collect and analyze the data (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
As regards to our research, we decided to collect the data by structured interviews. In terms of the 
sampling method, we followed exclusively one rule. The informants interviewed must have 
participated in at least one of the completed projects. For the data analysis, we used a thematic 
analysis method. Below, the research design is described in details 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
The data was collected mainly through qualitative interviews, a flexible tool that enabled the 
variation of the structure of the questions depending on the status of the process and the role (in 
the project) of the respondent (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). In particular and following the SVV 
guidelines, we elaborated structured questions aiming to collect the data along the selected 
informants for the process. The interview guide was structured in three sections. The first section 
sought to understand the profile and experience of the informants along the project(s). Thereby, 
the guide looked into the experience, role and responsibilities of the informants. The second section 
aimed to explore the “lived” experiences of the informants in the project(s). In particular, the 
questions investigated in details the identification process of the SVV components, and the 
challenges faced during this task. Finally, the third section pointed to contemplate the two potential 
alternatives for the new tunnel. Hence, we asked the informants (that are part of the new project) 
to assess the sea and land alternatives using the components as the evaluation criteria (See Appendix 
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E - Guide of the interview). Additional data was extracted from a series of documents elaborated 
by SVV. These documents were delivered by the informants or found as public reports on the web. 
Regardless of the structure and straightforwardness of the questions used in the interviews, in each 
discussion the informants had the space to illustrate and extend themselves in the description of 
their experiences. Moreover, the interviewer pursued them to provide factual facts, examples and 
concrete data of the completed projects. Indeed, these were the findings that we were looking after. 
We were interested in the intangible information that exclusively a present witness has; the type of 
findings that you will only get if you “live” a similar project. In our case, the completed tunnel 
projects. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of each interview the interviewer informed the participant about the 
purpose and context of the master thesis. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 90 minutes, 
and were held in person and some by communication tools as skype or phone. Favorably, the 
questions in the interviews were simple structured and straight to the point. The latter, plus the fact 
that the interviewers have the right preparation and experience to discuss the components from an 
expert level, facilitated a steady flow in the data collection process.  
3.3.3 Sampling Method 
The sampling method for this report followed a purposive method based on a single condition 
(Petty et al., 2012). The informants must have participated in the cost estimation process of at least 
one of the completed projects. In that line, we requested SVV a list of potential informants that 
fulfilled the condition. SVV gave us a list of five contacts, from which four answered and attended 
our request. In addition, during the interviews some of the informants by request from the 
interviewer or by themselves recommended additional contacts that might be useful for the 
research. In this manner, we added two more informants for the study (One from SVV and one 
external consultant from ViaNova consultants). As follows a brief description of the profile and 
the importance of each of the informants for the research: 
 Leif Hafstad: Hafstad is a project and construction manager in SVV. He has performed 
different roles in multiple tunneling and road projects with SVV for more than 15 years. In 
regards to our research, he worked in the Strindheim Tunnel, specifically as construction 
manager for the concrete tunnel built by NCC (E6-Stjørdal project).  Nowadays, he is in 
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the construction team for the Helltunnel. In the cost estimate assessment of the Strindheim 
tunnel, his was the price giver and aimed to guarantee quality in the exercise specifically 
in regards with the costs (numbers) defined. Leif exercises a key role in the assessment. 
 
 Jarle Tangen: Tangen is a staff manager for SVV. He has worked more than 10 years in 
road and tunnel projects along Norway.  Regarding our research, he was part of the SVV 
team in the Dovrebanen project, in which SVV worked in partnership with JBV. In this 
project, he experienced the challenges of developing a cooperative project, which was also 
constrained by the working hours and train operations. The last fact was important for the 
alternatives evaluation, especially for the land tunnel option. He was part of the cost 
estimate group for the Dovrebanen project. 
 
 Torstein Ryeng: Ryeng is a traffic engineer working as planning leader in SVV. He has 
worked in multiple road and tunnel projects. He has experience in several tunnel projects. 
Moreover, he is the manager of the planning team for the Helltunnel. Torstein has the 
technical expertise, clear panorama and fresh information about the requirements and 
conditions of the new tunnel. Ryeng has participated in several cost estimates and he will 
be part of the Ranheim-Værne’s assessment.  
 
 Hilde Prestvik: Prestvik is the leader of this master thesis in SVV. She has worked as 
coordinator and leader in several projects within SVV. Her role for this research is related 
to her participation in the design team of Helltunnel, and her guidelines for the research. In 
the new tunnel, she arranges the permits with the governmental authorities and 
builds/coordinates the project plans. In addition, she provided us with information about 
the design, challenges and conditions of the alternatives for the new project.  
 
 Erling Graarud: Graarud is a senior consultant for the plan and traffic division of 
VIANOVA Consultants. In addition, he worked almost 5 years with SVV and took the 
preparation to be a process leader in the SVV cost estimate assessments. Tangen 
recommended him due to his expertise and experience in the Dovrebanen project. In this 
project, Graarud was involved from the beginning in the establishment of the contracts for 
the three sub-projects. Then, he joined the engineering team of the sub-project developed 
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by VIANOVA. In addition, he led the cost estimate process for the above referenced sub-
project. 
 
 Erik Østmo: Østmo started in SVV in 2011 and his responsibilities are related to projects 
developed in the Trondheim’s area. For our research, he was one of the construction leaders 
of the Strindheim tunnel. He got involved in the project, after the death of the original 
project manager of the project.  
3.3.4 Analysis of information 
Concurrently with the data collection, the information was being analyzed after each interview. 
The researcher used an iterative analysis moving back and forth between the data collection and 
data analysis until there was theoretical sufficiency or saturation of information (Petty et al., 2012). 
For the analysis, we used a thematic analysis method aiming to identify patterns, similarities, 
variations and relationships along the defined components of the cost assessment (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Petty et al., 2012). Thus, we first transcribed the recorded interviews. Then, we sent the 
transcriptions to the informants in order to confirm that the interpretation was correct and nothing 
was missing. Consequently, we read the collected information several times seeking to gain 
familiarity. Although, this sort of analysis is a flexible tool to collect rich and detailed data, it was 
critical to follow the guidelines given by SVV to encircle the analysis and avoid the “anything goes 
critique”, described by Braun & Clarke (2006). Due to it, we stuck to our objectives and held our 
investigation within the above-defined scope. To illustrate, Figure 8 shows the established 
procedure:
 
Figure 8 - Procedure for analysis and validation 
•Recorded 
interviews
•Reflections
Transcribe
Gain 
familiarity
Read 
transcripts
•Patterns
•Similarities
•Variations
Idenfify
•Validate 
•Group
Organize
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3.4 Quality 
There were three shortcomings for the data collection. First, two of the interviews were handled in 
Norwegian. The author prepared the interviews and carried the discussion with his level in the 
language (working proficiency level).  Although, the interviews went well, it was relevant to state 
this “obstacle”. Second, the inexperience of the interviewer might affect the quality of the 
investigation (along all the phases: data collection, analysis and validation). Nonetheless, literature 
review on the topic and trial sessions were conducted to improve the capacities in the field. Third, 
there was no statistical treatment of the sample; therefore, its representativeness of the population 
could be flawed.On the other hand, to assure quality and mitigate the biases, the data was evaluated 
regarding confirmability, dependability, credibility and transferability. In Table 2, the reader could 
identify the tactics used in each of the above-mentioned quality criteria: 
Qualitative 
Criteria 
Description (Petty et al., 2012) Tactics 
Confirmability 
The extent to which the findings 
are the product of the inquiry and 
not the bias of the researcher 
(1) Triangulation:  Reduce researcher bias 
through the collection of data from different 
perspectives (SVV documents and reports) 
Dependability 
The extent to which the study could 
be repeated and variations 
understood 
(1) Record the interviews and keep the file 
until confirmation of the transcripts is 
received 
(2) Transcribe the interviews and confirm 
consistency of the findings 
Credibility 
Degree to which the findings can be 
trusted or believed by the 
informants of the study. Explore the 
whole phenomenon in all its 
complexity 
(3) Member checking: send the transcripts to 
the informants seeking for confirmation of the 
findings and to avoid misinterpretations 
(4) Triangulation: evaluate the veracity of the 
findings by assessing them within the group 
(one informants provides an insight, which is 
further test with other informant) 
(5) Referential adequacy materials: 
Enriching the understanding with data 
of the two completed projects (context) 
such as: reports, drawings, news 
  
(6) Triangulation: Confront the findings with 
other sources of information, such as: papers, 
literature, external experts 
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Transferability 
The extent to which the findings can 
be applied in other contexts or with 
other informants 
(7) The components defined by SVV apply 
for any tunneling project 
(8) The findings will be transferred and 
adapted to the new cost estimation process for 
the new tunnel 
 
Table 2 - Tactics selected (Yin, 2010) 
Furthermore, two circumstances could have affected the quality of the information. First, some 
informants were (at the time of the interviews) part of the cost estimation team for the new tunnel. 
This factor could have increased the bias in their opinions and deviate the accuracy of their mental 
evaluations. Second, the majority of the informants worked (at the time of the interviews) with 
SVV. It is possible that their opinions were biased and the drawn reality was not completely 
accurate. At last, Figure 9 shows the breakdown of the above explained research methodology:  
 
Figure 9 - Description of the research methodology 
3.5 Ethical and Advisory Guidelines 
The names of the informants are used and referenced throughout the document. In order to do this, 
we asked and received authorization from the informants and SVV. For the interviews, we asked 
for permission to record the discussions with audio recording software. The objective was to 
facilitate the interviewer’s job by enhancing the data collection and analysis. All the informants 
accepted to be recorded. Moreover, the files were eliminated as soon the feedback from the 
informants was received.  
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4. Results & Findings 
In the following section, the results of the analysis are presented. The chapter is divided in two 
main sections. Firstly, the challenges along the areas of interest appointed by SVV are described. 
Lastly, the two alternatives of the tunnel are described and further discussed with regard to the 
areas of interest defined by SVV and the insights of the experts.  
4.1 Areas of interest 
Table 3 exhibits the areas of interest appointed by SVV: 
Areas of Interest - SVV Description 
(1) Disposal of masses Describes the practice and process of dealing with the 
remains of the construction (rocks masses, gravel, soil, etc.) 
(2) Rigging Related to the cut of a circular hole in the surface of the 
mountain 
(3) Project Management Management of the project organization 
(4) Environmental Measures Measures required to mitigate environmental damages due 
to the project 
(5) Mountain Quality Corresponds to the geological composition of the mountain 
(6) Time of Construction Length of the project 
(7) Work restrictions Work restrictions in terms of timetables and days 
Table 3 - Areas of interest SVV 
As follows, a description of the major challenges of each area based on information collected in 
the interviews: 
4.1.1 Disposal of masses 
This factor is a major uncertainty in tunnel projects. The following tables summarize the principal 
challenges of this factor based on the informant’s opinion: 
 Quantification of the remains of the construction: the quantification of masses is done using 
a software that runs mathematical models and seeks to calculate the amount of material that 
would be extracted from the construction. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Graarud, Hafstad, Ryeng (1) Generally, the results given by the program are not 
certain and the difference against reality varies in every 
case. 
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Hafstad (2) In the NCC part of the tunnel, there were 100.00 m3 
of masses extracted. The variation in the quantification 
of masses was about +/- 10% in comparison to reality. 
In general, this range is common in the majority of the 
projects. However, there are special cases where the 
situation is different. 
Østmo (3) In the Strindheim tunnel, there were around 600.000 
m3 of rock. The outcome given by the software varied 
+/-10% with respect to reality. 
Graarud (4) In the Dovrebanen – Vianova part of the project, 
they estimated remains of 1.520.000 m3 for the cost 
estimate. However, during the drilling they discovered 
an unforeseen part of the mountain, which added 
approximately 750.000 m3. Consequently, the plans 
changed and the project team had to find solutions for 
an unexpected situation. This was an unusual case; 
nonetheless, the importance of the pre-studies was 
reinforced (See Appendix F) 
Tangen (5) Due to the size of the Dovrebanen project an 
enormous amount of loose masses and rocks were 
extracted from the construction site. Along the three 
sub-projects, the masses extracted amounted 
approximately four million m3. The variation between 
reality and the number calculated by the software was 
around +/- 10%. The difference in such a big project 
brought substantial additional costs and work. 
Nonetheless, he stated that the only strategy to cope this 
uncertainty is through pre-studies and site research. 
Table 4 - Quantification of the remains of the construction 
 Different types of materials: there is uncertainty about the type of materials that will be 
extracted from the mountain. The pre-studies can show a pattern but nothing is proven until 
they drilling is finished. 
 
Informant(s) Insights 
Graarud, Ryeng (1) The importance in this factor is that some of the material is usable 
for the construction, but the unusable material have to be relocated 
somewhere else. From this factor derives the complexity, given that 
the amount and type of material is uncertain and the project team is 
required to have a solution to it. 
Tangen (2) In the Dovrebanen tunnel, the materials extracted were better than 
expected. They took out mainly loose masses (around 90%), the rest 
were usable rocks. 
46 
 
Østmo (3) The Strindheim tunnel is an example of the complexity of the 
mountain geology. According to the pre-studies, the mountain had in 
general bad rock (unusable) and it was uncertain if the materials could 
be used for the grilstadmarina. However, during the drilling they 
discovered that the conditions were better than expected and most of 
the rock were used in the marina project. 
Table 5 - Different type of materials 
 Defining the deposit place(s) for masses (temporarily and permanently): in accordance with 
the previous factor, the project team has to define: (1) a place(s) to deposit temporarily the 
masses that were extracted from the construction. This place is preferably located close to 
the rig sites and must have enough space to store the masses, equipment and other facilities 
required for the operation. On the other hand, (2) a place(s) to deposit the unusable material 
has to be arranged, these additional masses have to be relocated in pre-established places. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Graarud, Ryeng (1) Both places require certain characteristics and must be 
strategically located to hold an efficient operation. The project team 
has to process permits and sign agreements with different authorities 
and private parties. In addition, the distance variable plays an 
important role the closest to the construction site; the cheaper and 
easier would be to move the masses.  
Østmo (2) In the Strindheim tunnel, the 90% of the rocks blasted were 
deposited in the grilstadmarina. It was a simple process given that the 
entrepreneur who was transporting the rocks had also a construction 
contract with the marina. The importance of assuring these factors in 
advance was emphasized. 
(3) In the Strindheim tunnel, the majority of masses were used to 
cover a rubbish dump in the Munkholmen area, and the rest helped to 
level the ground above the tunnel (around 5%). These considerations 
were defined in advance by the management of the project, and all the 
agreements were already signed when the extraction started. 
Ryeng (4) The relevance of having good information about the masses for 
the regulation of the project was highlighted. It is important to 
establish the places and start the conversations in an early stage of the 
project. Moreover, the municipalities and communes would not 
accept a project without a well-structured study for the relocation of 
the masses. 
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Graarud (5) In the Dovrebanen tunnel, given the inconveniences in the mass 
quantification, the management team had problems to allocate the 
“extra” masses extracted from the tunnel. There were moments where 
they did not have control of the masses, this situation continued 
throughout the project execution. Furthermore, giving the conditions 
of the Dovrebanen project some of the rocks and masses were used to 
fill and level the path of the new railway. It was not a large quantity 
of material, but the allocation process was very simple. 
Tangen (6) In the Dovrebanen project, four million m3 of masses were 
extracted and relocated as follows: three million m3 were used in the 
railroad construction; 0.5 million m3 are deposited in a rented space 
(will be used in a road project in 2018-2023); and the rest were used 
in the pre-works of a future JBV project at the Eidsvoll Kommune.  
(7) The importance of settling agreements with the private/public 
owners of the disposal places in an early stage of the project was 
stressed.  It is recommendable to ensure additional space for at least 
10-15% of the masses calculated initially. This, in order to avoid 
shortages of space in case the amount of masses is larger than 
expected. The latter situation was faced in the Dovrebanen project. 
They reached a point where there was not enough space to deposit the 
masses, thus they had to go to the market and find a new spot for a 
higher price. 
 
Table 6 - Defining the deposit place for masses 
 Crush site: in order to use the “good”/useful rocks, the project requires a place to crush 
them before using them in the construction. In that sense, a location with certain conditions 
has to be defined. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Hafstad, Østmo (1) In the Strindheim tunnel, there was no crushing site, given that all 
the rocks were immediately transported to the final destination, for this 
case the grilstadmarina  
Hafstad, Graarud, 
Ryeng 
(2) It should be: (1) away or distant from the resident areas, (2) 
preferably, close to the rig site(s), (3) big enough to hold the crushing 
processes and to store a large quantity of rocks  
Tangen (3) For the Dovrebanen tunnel, they settled a crush site in the 
proximities of the main rig. The construction site was in general 
unoccupied, so the team defined a near location where the rocks were 
crushed. Nonetheless, the space was very limited in terms of size. 
Hence, the crushing operation was limited and some delays were 
caused  
Table 7 - Crush site 
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 Transportation and final destination: the way of transportation (car, boats, barges, etc.) and 
the routes selected to move the masses to the pre-established places have to be arranged. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Ryeng (1) In the Strindheim tunnel, the masses were transported by boats. This 
methodology is more effective and causes less problems with the 
residents of the area. 
Graarud, 
Hafstad, 
Ryeng 
(2) The vehicles and means need to fulfill certain requirements and 
measures must be taken to avoid any type of damages during the 
transportation. 
 Østmo (3) The masses were transported from the temporary deposit areas to 
the final destinations by trucks in the Strindheim Tunnel. These trucks 
were loaded using a loader, which picked up the material from the 
deposit. In addition, the rocks and trucks were flushed and rinsed to 
avoid the dispersion of dust and material while transporting. 
Hafstad (4) The importance of finding ways of transportation that would not 
affect the daily life of the neighbors was stressed. In the NCC's part of 
the Strindheim tunnel, barges transported 80 - 85% of the masses to the 
final destination. 
 Tangen (5) In the Dovrebanen project, the rocks and masses used for the 
construction of the railroad were transported using trucks within the 
construction site. The rest were moved by road to their final 
destinations. 
Table 8 - Transportation and final destination 
 Parties: the construction managers have to make agreements with all the parties affected 
(positively, negatively) with the handling and disposal of the masses. 
Informant(s) Insights 
 Østmo (1) In the Strindheim Tunnel, there were some claims from the residents 
of the construction area. Although, the measures taken to avoid dust in 
the residential areas and roads, some materials was dispersed in certain 
areas. Hence, the people started to complain and SVV had to take extra 
measures to avoid further events 
 Graarud, 
Prestvik, 
Hafstad 
(2) The list of stakeholders could be large. All of them will have 
different interests, expectations and prices 
Table 9 - Parties 
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4.1.2 Rigging sites (Drilling) 
This factor is a key variable for the tunneling projects. The importance relies on the number of 
places where the team could work simultaneously. It is highly influential for the development and 
length of the project. 
 Number of rig sites: every design of a tunnel possess different characteristics, one of them 
is the number of sites available to locate the drilling equipment. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Ryeng, Hafstad, 
Prestvik, Tangen, 
Graarud 
(1) This factor is highly relevant for the project, because with more 
sites, the drilling and therefore the construction goes faster. 
Likewise, the increase on the costs. 
Ryeng (2) The amount of rig sites is completely related to the length of the 
project. The speed of a project can be shortened in half if you add an 
additional rig – example: with one rig one year; with two rigs half 
year - approximately- 
Østmo (3) In the Strindheim tunnel (5 km), they started with four rigs. After 
certain point, they kept completed the drilling with the two main rigs. 
At the end, each entrepreneur (NCC and Skanska) had its own drill 
and burst the hole from a different side. The length of the construction 
is aligned to the number of rigs, and it is very important to guarantee 
a continuous utilization of the possible sites. With one rig site, the 
operation has to be stopped with the extraction of masses and other 
operations with the equipment (maintenance, change of tools, etc.). 
Furthermore, the addition of one more rig reduces approximately 25% 
of the length of the project.  
Hafstad (4) SVV identified and bought the houses located in the established 
rigging area for the NCC contract. Based on their studies and the 
space available, they established one single rig for that excavation. 
(5) In the Strindheim Tunnel, the construction was divided in two 
contracts seeking to reduce complexity and separate both 
constructions. One, driven by Skanska with their equipment drilling 
the mountain tunnel. The second, operated by NCC with the cement 
tunnel. In terms of the possibility to add or not a new rig to a tunnel 
project, a new rig could increase in 40% the speed of the construction.  
(6) The relevance of settling the required facilities (offices, tools and 
parts deposit, cafeteria, bathrooms, etc.) in the proximities of the rig 
area was highlighted. The proximity of these places is highly relevant 
to save time and increase the effectiveness of the employees. 
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Tangen (7) The importance of having as many rigs as possible, especially 
when there is space and funds to accelerate the operation was stressed. 
In the Dovrebanen project, there was a shortage of space in the rig site 
for the entrepreneur. Therefore, it was actually difficult to settle the 
tools and facilities required for the operation. Likewise, the 
transportation of masses internally and externally were at some time 
limited or restricted. 
Table 10 - Number of rig sites 
 
 Distance to the masses deposit: it is important to contemplate the distance between the 
drilling places and the deposits. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1) It was a success factor to have a temporary deposit place close to 
the rig area in the Strindheim tunnel (located 300-400 away from the 
main rig). The masses and rocks were collected here and, further 
transported to the final destination by the entrepreneur. 
Graarud (2) The shortness of the route, the better to transport the materials. In 
addition, the manager should choose to work harder in the drilling site 
that is nearest to a deposit. 
Tangen (3) In the Dovrebanen project, the temporary deposits of masses were 
located close to the rig site(s). The challenge with these places was 
regarding the size. In regards of the permanent deposits, the biggest 
one was right inside the construction (the railway) and the other were 
located 10 -20 km away from the project site. 
Table 11 - Distance to the masses deposit 
 Resources of the entrepreneur:  It is important that the entrepreneur has the capacity 
(economic, equipment) and expertise to hold the operations continuously. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo, Hafstad (1) The expertise and resources of the entrepreneur are highly 
important for the development of the project. It is necessary to have 
the financial muscle, the equipment and technology necessary to 
execute the project.  
Tangen (2) In the Dovrebanen project, the entrepreneurs received the first 
payment after two months of operation (no payments in advance). 
Hence, it is required to have companies with the equipment and the 
capacity to hold the operations with their own resources. 
Table 12 - Resources of the entrepreneur 
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4.1.3 Project Management 
Acceding to all the informants, the management of the project was a highly important factor. They 
agreed that the topics related to PM are not easily to discuss. The project members always leave 
behind these issues while they prioritize technical conversations.  
 Experience and leadership of the Project Manager: It is important to have an experienced 
leader that is confident to take the right decisions (even though they can be unpopular) and 
that is able to cope with the political side of the project. 
 
Informant(s) Insights 
Hafstad (1) Each stakeholder has different wishes and expects something 
different from the project. In fact, the latter is one example of the 
situations that the leadership needs to handle. 
(2) SVV gathered all the contact information of the people living in 
the area of the project. This information was used to build a 
communication channel between the parties involved in the project. 
The data was handled and distributed under the supervision of SVV, 
given that SVV must exercise as the leader of the project and that 
must be understood along all the parties.  
Østmo (3) In the Strindheim Tunnel, there were two managers. One focused 
in the construction management and another one handling the project 
management. In addition, there were five control engineers in the 
tunnel day and night given the 24/7 operations. The two-leader 
strategy allowed each of them to specialize in its own area.  
Tangen (4) In the Dovrebanen project, the work force was extremely 
qualified. The importance and size of the project encouraged the SVV 
experts to apply and be part of the project. Hence, the recruitment 
process was not a problem. 
(5) The Dovrebanen project was led by two organizations, which 
means that neither SVV nor JBV had full power over the other 
party. Hence, the decisions were agreed between one person 
responsible for JBV and one for SVV. This situation facilitated 
some processes, but also created some delays in the decision making 
process. 
Table 13 - Experience and leadership of the PM 
 Front-End: the amount of time and funds that the project can use in the front-end phase. In 
this stage, the team demands funds and time to do a proper planning of the activities with 
good information. Hence, the question is about the availability in respect of both matters.  
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Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1) It was challenging at the beginning given that the managers of the 
Strindheim Tunnel were assigned after the death of the original PM. 
Certain plans were already established and the new management had 
to inform themselves and started to lead something unknown in 
different aspects. The good documentation and expertise of the team 
helped much in this learning process. 
Ryeng (2) The relevance of defining the project team in an early stage of the 
project was stressed. The plans could be established but the team is 
responsible to implement them.  
Graarud (3) The relevance of including all the disciplines in the early stages of 
the process was highlighted. The risk of errors was reduced through 
the interdisciplinary coordination and the quality assurance strategies 
defined in the front-end phase.  
Table 14 - Front-End 
 Availability of Economic Resources: Due to the conditions and rules established by the 
government, the availability of funding is one of the obstacles that the PM has to deal with. 
The resources normally are not available when needed, but they rather come when decisions 
have already been made (Graarud, Hafstad, Prestvik). 
Informant(s) Insights 
Graarud (1) Graarud stated: “Sometimes there is not enough budget for 
planning; the system forces you to take decisions without information. 
This affects the amount and quality of information used in the 
estimation”. Thus, it is recommended to elaborate a financial plan 
with enough economic resources in the front-end phase. In that line, 
the project team can collect relevant data and structure a proper work 
plan. 
Tangen (2) The challenge relies in structuring a consistent financial plan, in 
which the “kommunes” could confirm that the money will be 
recovered. The significance of having enough resources to build a 
precise plan with quality information was appointed.  
Table 15 - Availability of economic resources 
 Coordination between entrepreneurs:  It is usual to have different entrepreneurs working 
in the same project, sometimes developing independent activities and in charge of 
complementary tasks. Here arises the importance of coordinating the activities along the 
different contractors. 
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Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1) In the Strindheim tunnel there were two contractors operating the 
drilling activities. Skanska with the mountain tunnel and NCC with 
the loose mass tunnel. Both drilling from different directions. At 
certain point, the two entrepreneurs met and there were some 
controversy in regards to the ventilation costs for the tunnels. Here, 
SVV intervened and as the project owner conducted the parties to 
reach a solution based on the agreements established in the contracts. 
Hafstad (2) Due to the division in the drilling operations in the Strindheim 
tunnel, SVV established periodical meetings with the two 
entrepreneurs. In these meetings, each company updated the status of 
their work and if necessary, coordinated activities in conjunction and 
planned the following weeks. These meetings were critical for the 
planning and management of the project. 
Graarud, Tangen (3) For the Dovrebanen project an integrated collaboration model 
was developed. Each entrepreneur designed and modelled their 
infrastructure and then, these designs were integrated in a 3D 
collaboration model for the whole project. This innovative technique 
enabled them to: (1) have a better planning and scheduling process; 
(2) improve quality assurance and quality control; (3) get a better 
understanding of the project and its challenges. 
Table 16 - Coordination between entrepreneurs 
 Market Situation: in terms of the market price, there is always an enormous uncertainty 
regarding the different cost elements of the project. Starting with the price of the tenders 
delivered by the entrepreneurs, the amount of projects under construction at the beginning 
of the construction (close/away to the area), and continuing with the actual cost of the 
materials at the construction time. These factors plus many other variables makes the 
calculation process a complicated activity. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Graarud (1) In the Dovrebanen project due to the size of the project, national 
and international companies were expected to participate in the 
tendering process. Hence, strong cost differences among the tenders 
were expected to happen. In addition, the cement cost projection was 
considered optimistic on the eyes of some of the informants. It was 
very difficult to reduce the uncertainty with respect to the market 
situation; they had to live with this uncertainty throughout the project. 
In fact, Graarud said: "in one stage of the project the difference 
between the tenders of the two cheapest entrepreneurs was around 
500.000 NOK".  
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Hafstad (2) This factor as one of the major uncertainties of every road and 
tunnel project. In the Strindheim tunnel, the strategy to cope this 
uncertainty was to publish in advance the project details along the 
construction media (news, magazines, etc.). Hence, the industry knew 
about the future project and started the discussion in a very early stage 
of the project.  
Tangen (3) Tangen added: “the big uncertainty is to foresee how would be the 
market situation when the project execution starts”.  In addition, SVV 
wondered whether the project was too big for the national 
entrepreneurs or too small for the international companies. To cope 
the uncertainty, the project team applied two strategies: (1) Check the 
amount of similar projects that are and will be executed in the same 
period of the Dovrebanen; (2) Use the prices of recent similar projects 
to guide the cost estimation process. The strategies reduced the 
uncertainty but there was still nervousness with the market situation. 
To illustrate, for one part of the project the tenders received had a 
difference of 0.7 billion NOK between each other (1.5 MM – 2.2 
MM). 
Table 17 - Market Situation 
4.1.4 Environmental, Health & Safety Measures 
All the informants agreed on the importance of this factor. Nonetheless, it is highly dependent on 
the conditions of the project area. Each projects carries its own challenges and measures have to 
be taken to avoid or at least reduce the effects in the environment, health and safety of the humans 
and livings species of the area. SVV is completely aligned to the current worldwide concern about 
developing green projects.  
 Water: measures have to be taken to keep the hydric sources save. In brief, they should stay 
in the same state or even be enhanced by the project organization.  
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo, Hafstad (1) In the Strindheim tunnel part of the extracted masses were 
transported by barges. To assure a safe operation, SVV established 
procedures to load and unload these means and avoid any type of spill 
in the sea. 
Hafstad (2) The contracts demanded the entrepreneurs to use new machines, 
good technical information and safe procedures. In addition, the 
contractors were not allowed to have a diesel deposit on site. A truck 
must come, fill the tanks, and then leave the construction site.  
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Graarud (3) In the Dovrebanen project, the tunnel path was defined along the 
Mjøsa Lake. This factor demanded different strategies to secure the 
state of the lake. Among them, the following: cover the drilling sites 
to avoid the spread of dust and sand into the lake, cover the trunk of 
the trucks and barges to avert spills and, establish good practices and 
consistent assumptions to avoid leakages.  
Table 18 - Water 
 Biological factors (plants and animals): in case there are native animals and fishes in the 
construction site, they must be relocated using the proper techniques.  To accomplish this, 
it is important to follow the recommendations of the experts (Internal and external), and 
utilize the lessons learned from former experiences. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Ryeng (1) In general, any tunnel project could affect multiple biological 
factors that are located in the construction area. Therefore, the 
relevance of developing proper studios to map the species and their 
environments before decisions are taken was highlighted. 
Østmo, Hafstad (2) In the Strindheim tunnel, there was not a problem with plants and 
animals. The surrounding areas were mainly residential and urban. 
Graarud (3) In the Dovrebanen tunnel, the project team developed a 
“biological map”, in which the different type of plants and animals 
were defined and located. Although, there were few animals in the 
surroundings of the construction site (moose, birds), they did not 
require special measures because the project did not intercede with 
their daily activities and tracks.  
Tangen (4) In the Dovrebanen tunnel, they did not have to deal with 
endangered/protected species. The area where the tunnel was located 
did not need major environmental measures.  
Table 19 - Biological factors 
 Human factor: all the informants emphasize the importance of having appropriate practices 
and measures to guarantee the health of the human beings involved in the project. Both the 
construction workers and the residents/visitors of the area. 
 
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1) In the Strindheim tunnel there were some issues with the dust that 
came into the houses and along the roads while transportation of 
masses to their final destination. To solve this, SVV work together 
with Trondheim’s Kommune to clean constantly the areas the areas 
and roads used by the trucks. 
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Graarud (2) The construction area of the Dovrebanen project did not have 
many residents inhabiting the zone. Mainly cabins and farms 
surrounded the area. In that sense, to facilitate the works SVV bought 
part of the cabins and provided information about the project to the 
rest of the residents. In general, they understood the benefits of the 
tunnel and thus supported the project. Shortly, the importance of 
mapping and gathering the contact details of the people living or 
working in the area was stressed. 
(3) Giving the conditions of the Dovrebanen project, the project team 
had to take extra measures to: (1) assure the safety of the workers and 
people passing through the area; and, (2) to avoid damages in the 
established facilities of the railway. Consequently, the project team 
defined periods for drilling and blasting. Also, utilized different 
equipment depending the area under drilling, and had controlled over 
the areas that needed to be handled carefully. 
Tangen (4) The relevance of handling and controlling the spread of dust was 
reinforced. In a construction site, there are multiple sources of dust 
that could reach the residents/visitors of the area. Hence, In the 
Dovrebanen project they located the crushing sites as far as possible 
from the residential areas, and washed regularly the trucks used to 
move the masses. In addition, the roads were constantly rinsed by the 
entrepreneurs.  
Table 20 - Human factor 
 Noise and Nuisances: construction sites are open and noisy, and are often located near 
existing residential areas. In general, residents accept the noise from the construction site 
due to their temporary status. However, in case of extensions, delays or activities during 
the weekend noise complaints may be likely. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Hafstad (1) In the Strindheim tunnel, those living along the tunnel route 
could hear and notice the works happening underneath their 
houses. Specially, while drilling to seal the mountain at the 
forefront of the blasting. There were from two to eight explosions 
per day.  
(2) NCC in the Strindheim tunnel ran noise studies to avoid any 
type of inconvenience with the residents surrounding the 
construction site. This information enabled the company to 
assure a constant operation without disturbing the residents of the 
area, and to reduce the levels of pollution in case was necessary. 
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Graarud (3) In terms of the noise disturbance, the Dovrebanen tunnel had 
to establish certain noise barriers in some specific points. With 
the help of an acoustic company, they measured the noise levels 
in the residential areas prior the construction of the tunnel. Then, 
they simulated the sound levels with the tunnel construction 
completed. Based on this “noise map”, the project team identified 
specific zones that would be affected due to the increase in traffic. 
In these zones, noise barriers were established and some 
windows were replaced with wider glasses. There are certain 
noise limits that road projects are required to fulfill, the 
maximum level of noise allowed for this tunnel was 55 decibels.  
Tangen (3) In the Dovrebanen  tunnel, the majority of the claims with 
respect to sound were received while installing the ventilation for 
the tunnels. This task produces a high level of noise along the 
whole tunnel. To cope these claims, the situation was explained 
in the periodical meetings and the informants understood the 
temporary nature of the problem.  
Table 21 - Noise and Nuisances 
4.1.5 Mountain Quality (Geology) 
Every mountain has a different composition and hence, each case must be assessed independently. 
The only way to reduce this uncertainty is by running pre-studies that could provide insights of the 
mountain. 
 Number of Pre-studies: the best way to reduce uncertainty and mitigate the effects of 
changes in the geology is the pre-studies. These exercises provide relevant information to 
make decisions and take preventive measures. The dilemma with this factor is about “How 
many resources are available / willing to use in these studies? And how many studies are 
available / willing to do before taking decisions?”  
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1)The importance of having information of the quality of the 
mountain in advance was appointed. From this information, several 
operations could be planned and coordinated.  
Hafstad (2) In addition to the pre-studies carried on during the front-end phase, 
it is critical to run additional studies while drilling.  At that moment, 
the construction team is able to map the geology of the following 
meters of mountain. This strategy was used consistently in the 
Strindheim tunnel. 
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Graarud, 
Hafstad, 
Ryeng, 
Østmo, 
Tangen 
(3) The importance of having several pre-studies in the planning phase. 
The well-structured plan along the Dovrebanen tunnel could be 
attributed to the information gathered during the front-end. Therefore, 
it is recommended to ask for additional funds for the initial stages of 
the project. It is vital to have enough funds to structure a robust front-
end. 
Table 22 - Number of Pre-studies 
 Land composition:  the land composition influences the techniques, equipment, materials, 
number of people and other variables involved in the project planning and execution. 
Consequently, the importance of mapping this information and taking the measures 
required. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1) In the Strindheim tunnel, the land composition was better than 
expected. However, measures were taken in advance to face more 
complex conditions. This fact, allowed the project team to be over 
prepared and ran the construction smoothly. 
Hafstad (2) In NCC’s side, the quality of the masses extracted was as expected. 
Thus, the entrepreneur collected and transported them to the deposit 
area as planned. There were not different requirements in terms of 
equipment, techniques or materials. The pre-studies provided the right 
information and the operations were handled as planned.  
Graarud (3) Regardless the land composition/quality of the mountain, the cost 
of drilling and blasting the tunnel is in general similar for any tunnel 
project. The importance of this factor relies on two considerations: (1) 
usability of the materials extracted, and (2) the speed of the operation 
due to the sealing operations. In the Dovrebanen tunnel, the mountain 
had good conditions (usable materials, tightness of the mountain, non-
residential area above the tunnel and low levels of water in the surface). 
Therefore, they could move forward 20-30 meters each week and use 
the rocks for the road construction. With other conditions, the progress 
should have been slower and more expensive. 
Table 23 - Land composition 
 Sealing / Grouting6 (Water): the amount of resources and the speed of the process in these 
two activities is related to the mountain composition (Graarud, Hafstad). With bad rock the 
process is slower and the cost is higher (due to a major use of cement) 
                                                 
6 Grouting: the grouting process is primarily carried out for the purpose of improving impermeability of the rock-
mass otherwise scattered due to bad rock quality and blasting during excavation. It also improves the rock strength 
by way of solidifying (consolidation grouting) and to control leakage by way of introducing an impervious stratum 
and suitable drainage system (curtain grouting) 
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Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo, Hafstad (1) The conditions with respect to the water above the tunnel were 
better than expected. The construction team did less grouting, so less 
money was used to secure the tunnel. However, it was highly relevant 
to guarantee no leakages due to the facilities and residents living 
above the tunnel. 
Graarud (2) The relevance of doing a proper grouting in the areas exposed to 
potential leakages was stressed. In the Dovrebanen project, they did 
not have resident areas in the surroundings but they used cement in 
certain areas to avoid land sinking due to water penetrations. For the 
cost calculation, the significance of acknowledging the tightness of 
the mountain and the amount of water located above the tunnel was 
highlighted. The sealing cost varies depending on the conditions of 
the mountain, in Mjøsa it was around 20.000 NOK per meter and in 
some projects in Oslo it could be over 40.000 NOK per meter. 
Table 24 - Sealing / Grouting 
4.1.6 Time of Construction 
The duration of the project is the number of calendar periods from the start of the execution phase 
until the deliverable is completed. This factor affects all the components of the project, and its 
effect is directly proportional to its length. 
 Project Cost: the length of the project is directly proportional to the final cost of the project. 
Therefore, without neglecting the quality, the project should be constructed as soon as 
possible. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Ryeng (1) Tunnel projects have tremendous capital expenditures due to the 
amount of resources (funds, equipment and personnel) required on 
site. 
Østmo 
(2) The Strindheim Tunnel finished 2-3 months later with respect to 
the plan. The reason was that an electro company got broke and 
operations were delayed. SVV had to hire a new company that could 
finish the job. There were extra costs caused by this issue and 
contractors able to cope the costs of the operations were required. 
Hafstad (3) In general the total cost of a tunnel project is more affected by the 
length of the construction that by any other variable. Indeed, all the 
available resource should  be used to reduce the construction time.  
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Graarud (4) In road constructions, the project organization (in this case SVV) 
does not calculate (1) the amount of money they can save/earn, and 
(2) how beneficial for the society would it be, if they finish the 
project earlier. Nevertheless, the economic and social benefits of a 
fast completion were emphasized 
Table 25 - Project cost 
 Negative / Positive effects: the duration of the project entails positive and negative effects. 
The important fact is to balance the variables in order to reduce the damages and take 
advantages of the opportunities.  
Informant(s) Insights 
Graarud, Prestvik (1) Extra costs and delays in transportation suffered by the residents 
and visitors of the area. It is relevant to get the return on investment 
as soon as possible.  
Hafstad (2) Example: Complex tunnel project, which took more time than 
expected. In that project, the project team received a strong opposition 
from the residents due to the length of the project. Thus, the use of 
the means necessary to speed up the project is required. 
Østmo, Hafstad (3) A mall was being developed in the proximities of one ramps of 
the Strindheim tunnel. The owners of the shopping center requested 
SVV to finish their works (in the area) earlier in order to exploit the 
Christmas season. SVV agreed and both parties covered the 
additional costs of accelerating the works in the area. At the end, SVV 
saved some money and the mall could take advantage of the holiday 
season.  
Table 26 - Negative / Positive effects 
4.1.7 Work Restrictions 
Depending on the surroundings of the construction area, each project has / has not certain 
restrictions in the working times. This factor is mainly constrained by the proximity of 
residential houses or commercial businesses (including railways, harbors, etc.) to the working 
area. The importance here is that these potential restrictions have to be mapped and then, the 
project team has to make agreements and establish rules to avoid complaints from the parties 
affected.  
 Stakeholder Management:  All the informants agreed on the importance of providing 
information and establishing agreements with the stakeholders involved in the projects. 
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According to them, the most appropriate tool is to inform and hear the claims from the 
involved parties.  
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo (1) It is important to have good communication channels with the 
residents of the area. In this project, SVV had periodical meetings and 
sent updating messages in order to keep the people informed about 
the project status. Here is vital to have a competent communication 
team, which could be able to express the messages in a proper way. 
Tangen, Graarud (2) The “shared” Dovrebanen project demanded massive internal 
coordination and communication, and it could be concluded that 
regardless the workgroup in this project, it is simpler to run the project 
alone. There were some difficult times, especially when JBV would 
not yield with respect to the train operations. In addition, plan and 
coordinate the project was a complex work due to the restriction that 
some activities could only be developed during the weekends (the 
train had less routes or was stopped). The only strategy to keep both 
parties aligned was to have periodical meetings. There were 
information meetings every Monday. In addition, it was mandatory 
the presence of the entrepreneurs in these meetings.  
Table 27 - Stakeholder Management 
 Operations planning: the difficulty and importance of planning in detail the operations 
when the project is limited by different type of restrictions (time, traffic, weather). The 
coordination and constant communication within the project organization is vital. 
Informant(s) Insights 
Østmo, Hafstad (1) Due to the location of the Strindheim Tunnel (inside the city), the 
project team could not develop noisy work in the NCC side (Drilling, 
pigging and blasting only. Monday to Friday from 7:00 – 22:00 and 
Saturday 8:00 – 17:00) during the nights due to the residential areas 
and facilities located above the construction area. Hence, the 
coordination and planning activities were critical to assure the 
development of these activities in the right timeframe. The rest of 
activities were generally developed during the nights. Nonetheless, 
Skanska did not have any restrictions and worked 24 hours given the 
location of their rig site. Recommendation: Rig sites over areas free 
of restrictions.  
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Hafstad (2) Map the activities and traffic surrounding the construction site. In 
the Strindheim tunnel, the project team acknowledged the amount of 
traffic in the different days of the week. In addition, SVV had control 
over the school and commercial operations in the area. This 
information allowed them to plan and coordinate their activities 
without disturbing the residents of the area. For example, some 
operations were executed in the summer time while the students were 
in vacations. 
Tangen, Graarud (3) In the Dovrebanen tunnel, SVV was limited by the railway 
operations and the on-going construction of JBV’s tunnel. It was 
established from the beginning that the train should not stop. Then, 
the drilling and blasting were restricted by the rail operations, and 
they needed to be coordinated with JBV. Likewise, the car traffic was 
also interrupted when blasting. Here, the project team mapped the 
differences of traffic during the day and based on that info SVV 
planned their operations. In general, the objective was to avoid/reduce 
the negative impacts transferred to the society. In order to avoid 
problems with the society, during the night there were only injection 
and securing activities.  
Table 28 - Operations planning 
 
4.2 Landside & Seaside Alternatives 
For the Helltunnel SVV is considering two alternatives: (1) the seaside tunnel and (2) the landside 
tunnel. (See Appendix A, B). Initially the landside alternative seems cheaper in comparison to the 
seaside, but its characteristics and, additional complications given the proximity to the railway and 
the amount of inhabitants surrounding the worksite can change the panorama. The Helltunnel will 
be built in the space between the E6 and the railway (approximately 15 meters away from the 
railway in certain parts of the stretch – See Appendix B).  
On the other hand, the seaside alternative aims to extend the shore and build the tunnel in a less 
congested zone (See Appendix A – Profile Sea Alternative). However, the initial investment is 
higher given the mountain composition and the extra works required. Nonetheless, the project 
duration is expected to be shorter and thus, multiple benefits (economical and non-economical) 
will arise. The following table portrays the considerations for both alternatives with respect to the 
SVV’s areas of interested and the cost variable: 
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(1) Disposal of Masses 
Landside Seaside 
(1) Dependence on the use of barges and 
roads to transport the masses (Hafstad, 
Prestvik) 
(1) The rocks will be transported to their final 
destination without crushing - bad quality 
(Hafstad) 
(2) Difficult to set the deposit and crushing 
place - noise disturbance for the residents 
(Hafstad) 
(2) The project is planned to be drilled from the 
middle to the corners. Several work restrictions 
are avoided and the masses could be extracted 
easily (Hafstad) 
(3) Part of the masses will be transported by 
road. The trucks will use the E6 and the old 
road across the residential area. This means 
that additional mitigation strategies to cope 
with the noise and dust have to be taken 
(Hafstad) 
(3) Short distance between the rig site and the 
Muruvik harbor (Prestvik, Ryeng, Hafstad) 
(4) Due to the location of the landside 
alternative, only a small amount of the 
extracted masses could be shipped by the 
Murvik harbor (Prestvik) 
(4) SVV lacks a deposit area for the masses in the 
Hell beach (Prestvik) 
(5) The masses handling and transportation 
might interrupt the traffic on the train and 
actual road (Hafstad, Prestvik) 
(5) All the masses will be relocated in the 
Trondheim’s fjord. The majority of them (around 
90%) will be transported to the Værnes airport 
(Prestvik, Hafstad) 
  
(6) Possibility to ship the majority (90-95%) of 
masses from the Harbor - avoid the use of barges 
and roads (Prestvik, Hafstad, Ryeng) 
Table 29 - Disposal of masses 
(2) Rigging 
Landside Seaside 
(1) Small space for only one rig (Hafstad) (1) Two rig sites. Big area for the main rig site 
that will establish 2 rigs and a bridge over the 
E6. Total rigs: 3 (Prestvik, Hafstad, Ryeng) 
(2) The project is planned to be drilled from 
the middle to the corners. Thus, several 
work restrictions are avoided and the masses 
could be extracted easily (Hafstad) 
(2) Large distance from the rig site to the railway 
(Ryeng, Hafstad) 
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(3)The Norwegian entrepreneurs have the 
expertise and equipment to develop this 
project (Hafstad, Ryeng) 
(3) The Norwegian entrepreneurs have the 
expertise and equipment to develop this project 
(Hafstad) 
Table 30 - Rigging 
(3) Project Management 
Landside Seaside 
(1) SVV is required to coordinate the work 
plan with the operations and suggestions of 
JBV (Hafstad, Ryeng, Prestvik) 
(1) Given the better safety conditions (while 
construction and after completion), the fire and 
governmental agencies support the sea tunnel 
(Prestvik) 
(2) The project will cause delays in the 
transportation of residents and visitors 
(Hafstad) 
(2) SVV would not have to coordinate their 
plans and operations with JBV and their 
operations (Prestvik, Hafstad, Ryeng) 
(3) Families have to be relocated 
permanently / temporarily - higher 
population (Prestvik) 
(3) JBV demands as much space as possible 
between the road and the railway. The sea side 
offers the best option (Prestvik) 
(4) Two public parks will be closed while 
construction (Prestvik, Hafstad, Ryeng) 
(4) There is already regulated road in the 
proximities of the rig site. This road could be 
developed simultaneously by SVV and used to 
have access to the operations of the Helltunnel 
(Prestvik, Hafstad) 
(5) The owner of the Muruvik harbor is JBV - 
governmental organization (Prestvik) 
  (6) Families have to be relocated permanently / 
temporarily - lower population (Prestvik) 
Table 31 - Project Management 
(4) Environmental, Health and Safety Measures 
Landside Seaside 
(1) The ways to dispose and transport the 
masses represent a potential threat to the 
environment (Hafstad, Prestvik) 
(1) Less emissions throughout the project 
(Prestvik) 
(2) Higher emissions throughout the project 
(Prestvik) 
(2) Biological factors(plants and animals) must 
be relocated (Prestvik) 
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(3) Conflicts with important tress and 
mosses. There is no cost or mitigation 
strategy for this issue, all the value would 
be lost (Prestvik) 
(3) The project requires an extension (filling) of 
the shore in a national nature area - safety and 
looks (Prestvik, Hafstad) 
(4) Big risk for the train in case of fire along 
the road tunnel (Prestvik) 
(4) After completion the extension will offer a 
new nature area for outdoor activities (Prestvik) 
(5) Higher probability that the residential 
houses will be affected with dust from the 
construction (Hafstad) 
Table 32 - EHS Measures 
(5) Mountain Quality 
| Seaside 
(1) The mountain quality is better than in the 
seaside. There will be less costs for sealing 
(Prestvik, Hafstad, Ryeng) 
(1) The mountain geology is bad and difficult in 
the middle of the Helltunnel. Worse conditions 
compared to the landside alternative (Hafstad, 
Prestvik) 
(2) The seaside alternative demands a greater 
sealing work in comparison to the landside. 
Higher costs in this task (Prestvik, Hafstad) 
(2) The old tunnel could be used to run pre-
studies for the new tunnel (Prestvik, 
Hafstad) 
(3) In order to foresee the quality of the mountain 
the construction team can used the parallel tunnel 
to run pre-studies along the complete path 
(Hafstad) 
  (4) SVV has the expertise and knowledge to 
handle the geological challenges (Hafstad) 
Table 33 - Mountain quality 
(6) Time of Construction 
Landside Seaside 
(1) The project duration is estimated to be 
longer - at least 6 months (Prestvik, Hafstad, 
Ryeng) 
(2) Shorter period of construction at least 6 
months less (Hafstad, Prestvik, Ryeng) 
Table 34 - Time of construction 
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(7) Work Restrictions 
Landside Seaside 
(1) Work restrictions due to traffic (road and 
train) and residents living in the 
surroundings of the planned path (Hafstad, 
Prestvik) 
(1) Less restriction for the drilling and blasting 
operations (Hafstad, Prestvik) 
(2) Certain residents must be notified about 
the blasting of the tunnel (Prestvik) 
(2) The traffic could be restricted but the roads 
are expected to be open in general (Hafstad, 
Ryeng) 
(3) In case JBV extends its own tunnel 
before the Ranheim-Værnes project, there 
will be no space to settle a rig for the 
landside alternative (Prestvik) 
(3) In case the E6 is closed, the car drivers might 
be tempted to use the old roads (through the 
residential areas). This could be a problem for 
the resident living in the area (Hafstad) 
(4) Short distance to the railway (14 meters). 
Considerations have to be taken in order to 
guarantee safe and constant train operations 
(Hafstad, Prestvik) 
(4) JBV has regulated a second railway besides 
the current one. The sea tunnel would not 
interfere this project given the distance in-
between both tracks. JBV could use the 
infrastructure of the sea tunnel to develop their 
project (Prestvik) 
  (5) If there is any work restriction, it will be 
related to the residents living around the 
entrances of the tunnel. It might be restricted to 
move masses on Sundays (Hafstad)  
Table 35 - Work restrictions 
(8) Costs 
Landside Seaside 
(1) 14 million NOK for the trench and secure 
(sealing) the mountain - over 50 meters high 
trenching (Hafstad) 
(1) Additional 70 million NOK to seal the 
mountain (Hafstad) 
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(2) Extra costs for JBV and the society due 
to stops and delays in the train and road 
traffic. Likewise, the entrance to the airport 
could be closed temporarily (Prestvik, 
Hafstad) 
(2) Extra costs for JBV and the society due to 
stops and delays in the train and road traffic. 
Likewise, the entrance to the airport could be 
closed temporarily (Prestvik, Hafstad) 
Table 36 - Costs 
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5. Discussion 
In this chapter, we enlist and discuss the potential uncertain factors surrounding the cost estimate 
process for the new tunnel. The selection criterion is built on the lessons learned provided by the 
informants and the insights taken from the reviewed literature. In general, these factors are 
commonly present in tunneling projects; nonetheless, the following selection is case specific and 
takes into account the characteristics of the on-going project (Ranheim-Værnes). To preserve the 
consistency of the report, we decided to develop this chapter along the areas of interested appointed 
by SVV. In that sense, the main uncertain factors of each area are described and further analyzed.  
To start, let us present a “Tornado diagram” (See Figure 10) which contains the ranking of the 
different areas of interest. We categorized (vertically) these areas with respect to the influence that 
each could exercise in the cost estimation process for the on-going tunnel (Top – most influential 
variable). We considered that the two first variables are the most influential aspects for the current 
estimation process. Both provide the majority of uncertainty to the project and have direct effects 
in the rest of the areas. Figure 10 exhibits the relative importance (impact) of these variables with 
respect to the estimation process7: 
 
Figure 10 - Tornado diagram 
 
                                                 
7 The impact evaluation is the result of a subjective analysis based on the findings of the investigation 
1. Mountain Quality
2. Project Management
3. Time of Construction
4. Work Restriction
5. Rigging Sites
6. Environmental 
Measures
7. Disposal 
of Masses
Very High
High
Medium
Low
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Consequently, these areas are analyzed in the order established by Figure 10. As follows, we 
identified the main factors and provided recommendations to cope the uncertainty of each area of 
interested. A more detailed analysis was exercised for the areas 1 and 2: 
5.1 Mountain Quality 
The geology is the main source of uncertainty in a tunnel project (Bickel, 1996; Pennington, 2011; 
Read, 2004). Although, the ground and land composition of the mountain carrie positive / negative 
effects on the series of activities and processes presented in the planning and execution phases; the 
interpretation of these geological conditions is not a precise science, therefore, big problems and 
challenges shadow the project development (Read, 2004). As stated before, the ground studies are 
the unique tool to foresee the geological conditions along the stretch of the tunnel. Uncertainties 
such as the rock/soil characterization, water inflow, weaknesses and fault zones and disposal of 
masses, should be handled and mitigated with the best information collected from these 
investigations. The latter sounds very simple, however, these studies require time and funds; hence, 
they are generally limited and relative to each project. Even so, the benefits of having “good” 
information at the “right” time are priceless. Table 37 Table 37 - Discussion Mountain 
qualitysummarizes the main considerations and questions to solve with respect to the ground 
investigations: 
 
Table 37 - Discussion Mountain quality 
Considerations
• Additional funds in the early stages of the
project are vital to structure a robust front-
end
• The land composition influences multiple
variables (techniques, equipment,
materials, etc.) along the project planning
and execution
• The speed of the operations is related to the
conditions and challenges of the mountain
• Amount of pre-studies is directly
proportional to the cost and the information
quality
Questions to solve?
• Usability of the materials extracted
• Tightness of the mountain and the amount
of water located above the tunnel
• Feasibility and cost of the undertaking
• Required design giving the project
conditions and goals
• Amount and type of the masses extracted
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With respect to the mountain quality along the two alternatives, the initial pre-studies have shown 
better conditions in the mountain composition (rocks, masses) for the landside stretch. Specifically, 
in terms of the sealing works required to avoid the inflow of water to the construction area. This 
means, less costs for the securing and construction of the tunnel. However, additional challenges 
and limitations are entailed with this alternative. Among others, factors such as the length of the 
project, the masses disposal and the work restrictions hinder the project development (see the 
Landside & Seaside Alternatives section for details). The mass classification is not an issue for 
both alternatives.  
5.2 Project Management 
The second major uncertainty identified is the PM. Particularly, the disinterestedness and 
difficultness of discussing and establishing the grounds for the project organization in SVV (based 
on the informants opinions); and the responsibilities, tasks, expectations and challenges that the 
project team has to face along the PLC (JJ Reilly, 2000; J Reilly & Brown, 2004).  Indeed, PM is 
the key to the successful implementation of a project, and sometimes is left behind due to the focus 
in the technical and numerical details of the project (Read, 2004). In that line, Table 38 exhibits 
the main considerations and questions to solve of this area: 
 
Table 38 - Discussion PM 
71 
 
Moreover, we consider the Market Situation factor as one of the major uncertain factors among 
infrastructure projects in general. The fact that these projects are planned and valued years before 
the actual execution, brings a big load of uncertainty to the information and assumptions used to 
structure the project and its cost estimation. To cope this uncertainty, it is useful to: (1) map similar 
projects that are/ will be executed in the same period of time; (2) inform the industry and the public 
about the project; and (3) use similar projects to reference the assumptions used in the structuring 
of the project. Although, the latter strategies are helpful, the market situation uncertainty will be 
present throughout the project.  
In regards of the two alternatives, the PM uncertainty is equally important. Both alternatives require 
a well-structured project organization, and it could be said that, the differences rely mainly in the 
limitations and challenges imposed by the stakeholders involved in the project. For instance, in the 
landside alternative SVV is required to permanently coordinate their activities with JBV. Whereas, 
the sea alternative SVV can perform independently. In that sense, we elaborated a stakeholder 
management chart to illustrate the level of power and interest of the parties in the on-going project 
(see Figure 11):   
 
Figure 11 - Stakeholder Management Chart 
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From the chart above, the parties to manage closely (High power & High interest) are the key 
stakeholders of the project. On one side, the high likelihood of complaints from the harbor´s 
residents is an indicator to be aware of and mitigate. On the other side, regardless the alternative 
chosen JBV is an active player in the whole process. Their operations and interested could be at 
stake, thus, they would be present throughout the project.  
5.3 Time of Construction 
The time of construction is a variable affected by all the activities and processes of the project. Any 
problem or successful strategy has direct effect in its length. Therefore, the enormous complexity 
of calculating the exact duration of any project. In the same way that the time of construction is 
affected by multiple factors, its final duration has positive/negative effects on the stakeholders 
involved in the project. Either in terms of the additional/less costs of the project, or regarding the 
social benefits/difficulties derived from its length. Clearly, there are certain factors that exercise a 
higher influence in this variable and can either facilitate or extend the construction process. Figure 
12 highlights the key influencers identified in our investigation:  
 
Figure 12 - Discussion Time of Construction 
With respect to the two alternatives, the seaside stretch is expected to last approximately six months 
less that the land alternative. This difference could be relevant in terms of the cost; however, our 
research did not contemplate the calculation of the two scenarios. Then, it is not probed that it 
would be cheaper to build the “fastest” alternative. Nevertheless, it is clear that: (1) less problems 
and challenges would be faced if the construction ends earlier; and (2) all the available resources 
should be used in order to accelerate the construction process.  
Number of rig sites Ground conditions
Availability of 
resources
Work restrictions
Key 
factors
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5.4 Work Restrictions 
After our research, this factor was scoped towards the restrictions and limitations established due 
to the surroundings of the construction area. These characteristics of each project could limit the 
construction processes, thus, the operations have to be regulated and the work timelines must be 
set. Indeed, this factor is case specific and varies from project to project. However, we identified 
the following key strategies to cope the uncertainty of this factor (see Figure 13):  
 
Figure 13 - Discussion Work Restrictions 
Concerning the two alternatives, both would create inconveniences with the communities 
surrounding the Murvik harbor. The transport volume would be significantly increased, and as a 
result, complains and claims from the residents would be expected (either prior construction and 
under construction). SVV must establish communications with this community from the early 
stages of the project.  
The seaside alternative would have less work restrictions regarding the drilling and blasting 
activities. The reason is that the planned stretch lies away from the train operations and the major 
(1) Map the activities and traffic of the area
• Acknowledge the differences in traffic day by day/hour by hour
• Identify any routinary activities (schools, commercial, turistic, 
etc.)
(2) Develop strong communication channels
• Coordination meetings with the contractors
• Establish periodical meetings (all parties should be present)
• Send updating messages (mail, email, SMS)
(3) Stakeholder identification
• Get the contact information of the parties involved
• Map the negative effects due to the project
• Establish mitigation measures to avoid major inconveniences  
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residential areas. In that line, these noisy activities will not be drastically restricted as in the 
landside. In addition, the seaside alternative would not interrupt the traffic along the railway. This 
fact is highly relevant given that the train operations cannot be stopped; hence, the tunnel operations 
in the landside alternative must be coordinated with JBV.  
5.5 Rigging sites 
As stated above, the number of rig sites is directly connected to the length of the project. Its 
relevance relies on the number of places where the works can run simultaneously. Surely, the more 
sites the better; nonetheless, each rig requires a background infrastructure, resources, certain 
conditions and especially funds to hold constant operations. Yet, any additional rig reduces the 
construction time in 20-30% approximately (according to the informants), therefore, its relevance 
for the decision making process.   
In respect to the alternatives, the seaside offers better conditions in terms of space and location. 
The area is distant from the train operations and residential areas, and offers enough space to settle 
the facilities required for the operation. Two rigs (initially only one) will drill the tunnel from the 
middle to the corners of the stretch. On the other hand, the landside alternative has space for only 
one rig; thus, its complementary (handling of masses, maintenance, etc.) activities might be 
restricted. Moreover, in regards to the disposal of the masses, the rig site in the seaside is located 
in the proximities of the harbor. From this point, the majority of masses would be transported. In 
contrast, the landside would transport an important part of the masses through the public roads.  
5.6 Environmental, Health & Safety Measures (EHS) 
Aligned with the current concern for green projects, SVV establishes and follows strict rules to 
avoid / reduce the negative effects on the environment and the health of the community. The 
objective is to preserve or improve the environmental conditions of the construction area, and to 
guarantee the health & safety of the humans involved in the project. Factors like the water 
resources, the air purity, the plants and animals’ habitat, and the human health must be preserved 
and improved. Therefore, the project organization must take measures to keep the status quo of the 
area and its inhabitants. From the investigation, Figure 14 illustrates the key strategies to cope the 
EHS uncertainty: 
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Figure 14 - Discussion EHS 
Fortunately, the two alternatives do not have major EHS considerations. The seaside alternative 
has to take the measures required during the extension of the shore (filling), and it has to avoid any 
spill in the sea during the masses transportation. On the other hand, due to the surroundings of 
landside and the means of mobilizing the masses, major measures are required to avoid the spread 
of dust and to reduce the probability of accidents. In general, the seaside alternative provides a 
simpler scenario, plus the fact, that the emissions might be lower (given the length of the project).  
5.7 Disposal of Masses 
This factor is normally one of the major uncertainties of tunneling projects. The reason is that core 
activities (such as planning, definition of the deposit places, contracting, etc.) are defined with the 
information gathered in the early stages of the project. With information, we refer to the amount, 
quality, classification and usability of the masses taken from the construction site. However, SVV 
Define the operational procedure
• How to load and unload the masses?
• Measures during the equipment maintenance
• Timelines and considerations during the masses transportation
Measures to avoid spills
• Rinse and wash the equipment used to move the masses
• Cover the drilling sites, trucks, boats and equipment (avoid leakages and spread of 
dust)
Develop a biological map
• Map the plants and species of the area
• Consult experts about the proper form to handle the situation
Establish a communication channel
• Periodical meetings to listen and inform
Measure the noise levels
• Establish a "noise map" of the area
• Take measures to reduce the noise and nuisance (noise barriers, thicker windows)
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has already defined: (1) the final destination and means to transport the materials from the 
Helltunnel; (2) the no-establishment of crushing area in the construction area; and (3) the 
agreements with the recipients of the masses, which are actually interested in as much material as 
possible. Consequently, the uncertainty in this area is very low for both alternatives. Nonetheless, 
SVV must take preventive measures and control the compliance of them. 
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6. Conclusions 
The thesis was set out to explore and investigate the main uncertain factors influencing the cost 
estimation process of tunneling projects. Through a lessons learned methodology, we explored the 
areas of interest of the two completed projects and sought to extract the knowledge from the living 
experiences of the informants. Based on the collected information, we built up insights meant to 
foresee the uncertain events, provide flexibility and facilitate the decision-making processes in the 
ongoing cost assessment (Perminova et al., 2008). The study also explored the two potential 
alternatives established by SVV for the Helltunnel. We collected and illustrated the main 
differences of both alternatives with respect to the areas of interest appointed by SVV. 
From the investigation, we pointed out the Mountain Quality and the Project Management as the 
core areas of uncertainty for the Helltunnel. Both areas are project-specific and, its mitigation 
strategies demand significant resources (time and funds) and should last throughout the project. 
Moreover, we recommend SVV to pursue the seaside option. This alternative provides the best 
scenario along the areas of interest. The main considerations supporting our recommendation are: 
(1) the length of the project would be shorter; (2) SVV would be autonomous in its operations (no 
major dependency of JBV); (3) the operations would be less problematic for the residents of the 
area; and (4) the operational conditions during construction are better under this alternative. 
Nonetheless, the ground conditions are difficult and, SVV must explore and mitigate them in 
advance. 
These findings emerged from the “lessons learned” research strategy used in the investigation. 
With this methodology, we sought for organizational success through learning from project to 
project. Particularly, given that SVV is characterized by: (1) the project-based management, and 
(2) the temporary nature of its projects and processes (Williams, 2008). In that sense and 
contrasting the traditional use of LL (focused exclusively on the explicit knowledge, which could 
be found in the project’s documentation and is easy to document, e.g., costs, quantitative data), 
this study strived to collect the tacit knowledge (“know-how” and “know-why”) held by the 
informants (Schindler & Eppler, 2003). Notwithstanding the complexity of the data collection 
process, the study identified success factors, strategies, recommendations, and especially, 
experiences which would be used in the estimation process for the new tunnel.  
 
78 
 
For continuous improvement, we recommend SVV to guarantee constant project learning through 
regular reviews throughout the different project(s). The active gathering of these key experiences 
motivates the team (who could directly profit from the lessons learned) and increases the quality 
of the findings. Moreover, these practices would reduce the so-called organizational amnesia 
caused by the temporary nature of the work force involved in the project (Schindler & Eppler, 
2003). Hence, the knowledge (tacit and explicit) gained from project to project would be collected 
and used along the future endeavors of the organization. 
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Appendix A– Tunnel classes and profiles 
Tunnel classes and profiles used in the tunnel project reviewed (Vegvesen, 2006): 
 Tunnel Class F 
 
 Tunnel Class E 
 
 Profile Sea Alternative  
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 Tunnel Profiles – T9.5, T10.5 
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Appendix B – Stretch of the Alternatives  
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Appendix C – Soil testing for ground investigations  (Pennington, 2011) 
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Appendix D - Water tightness requirements for various tunnel applications (Haack, 
1991) 
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Appendix E – Guide of the interview 
The structured questions were: 
1. What was your role in the project(s)? What were your responsibilities? 
2. Did you participate in the cost estimation process? What was your role in that assessment? 
3. How long have you been working with tunnel projects? In How many tunnel projects have 
you participated? 
4. Based on the completed project(s), could you illustrate your experience in calculating the 
following components of the tunnel project? Could you enlist the major challenges of the 
task?  
 Disposal of masses 
 Rigging sites 
 Project Management 
 Environmental measures 
 Mountain quality 
 Time of construction 
 Work restrictions 
5. Which were the main challenges and factors influencing the above areas? 
6. What were the main uncertain factors involved in the above areas? 
7. Based on the same components, could you illustrate the challenges of the two alternatives 
for the new tunnel? 
8. Based on the same components, could you illustrate the uncertain factors of the two 
alternatives for the new tunnel? 
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Appendix F – Dovrebanen Project  
 Calculation of masses for the first part of the Dovrebanen project (Source: Erling 
Graarud): 
 
 
 
 Tornado Diagram for the Dovrebanen project – Major uncertainties (Jerbaneverket & AS, 
2011) 
 
